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ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION -
TAX EXPENDITURE OR PROPER




Since the 1950s, it has become fashionable to attack various pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code by calling them "subsidies"
rather than "proper" means of measuring taxable income.' These
"subsidies" through Code provisions have come to be referred to as
"tax expenditures," a term coined by Professor Stanley Surrey in a
speech he made as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy
on November 15, 1967.2 In that speech, Professor Surrey stated that
our tax system often deliberately departs "from accepted concepts of
net income," so that by granting exemptions, deductions, and credits
that are not appropriate to an accurate determination of net income,
the tax laws effectively provide what is usually accomplished by di-
rect expenditures. In effect, the Code produces "an expenditure sys-
tem described in tax language."' 3 The two principal complaints
against "tax expenditures" are that they are hidden within the tax
system and so do not receive the careful scrutiny to which direct ex-
penditures are subject4 and that they distort the proportionate bur-
den imposed by our progressive tax system and thereby violate the
principles of horizontal and vertical equity.5 Under Professor Sur-
rey's guidance, in 1968 the Treasury Department developed a "Tax
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1955, University of North Carolina; J.D.
1958, George Washington University - Ed.
t © Copyright 1980 Douglas A. Kahn. The author wishes to thank the following friends
and colleagues who were kind enough to read a draft of this Article and to offer their criticisms
and comments: Edwin L. Kahn, Professors William D. Andrews, Marvin A. Chirelstein, Mary
Lou Fellows, Pamela Gann, Richard Lempert, Michael Rosenzwaig, and Peter 0. Steiner.
Several other persons gave me their criticisms but I have omitted their names in the belief that
they would prefer it that way.
1. See, e.g., Blum, The Effect of Special Provisions in the Income Tax on Taxpayer Morale,
in READINGS IN FEDERAL TAxATION 41, 42 (1970).
2. See S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 3 (1973).
3. Id. at 3.
4. See id. at 1-4.
5. See Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementing Government Policy: 4 Compari-
son 1*ith Direct Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 720-23 (1970). Essentially, "horizontal
equity" means that persons having equal incomes should pay an equal amount of taxes. "Ver-
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Expenditure Budget" that purported to identify the tax subsidies
provided by the Code and to quantify the revenue cost of each sub-
sidy.6
For some years, the Tax Expenditure Budgets prepared by vari-
ous arms of the government have listed as a tax subsidy the amount
by which the accelerated depreciation deductions taken on buildings
exceed the amount of depreciation that would have been allowable
under the straight line method of depreciation. 7 A recent budget
prepared by Treasury for individual taxpayers lists the excess of ac-
celerated depreciation deductions over straight line as a tax subsidy
that cost the federal fisc some $460,000,000 in the year 1977.8 In
addition, the "subsidy" for asset depreciation range (ADR), an elec-
tion that permits a form of accelerated depreciation, 9 was stated to
be $100,000,000. In a budget for fiscal year 1979, the tax subsidy for
accelerated depreciation of buildings for both corporations and indi-
viduals was stated to be $605,000,000, and the tax subsidy for ADR
was stated to be $2,775,000,000.10
Many tax commentators, government officials, and members of
Congress have adopted the concept of a Tax Expenditure Budget
since Professor Surrey introduced it in 1967. Indeed, the Congres-
sional Budget and Impoundment Act of 1974 requires that Congress
and its budget committees examine tax expenditures as part of over-
all Federal budgetary policy." In July 1979, the Comptroller Gen-
tical equity" means that persons having a disparate amount of income should pay disparate
taxes in proportion to the progressive rate structure established by Congress.
6. See S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 4-14.
7. See id. at 8-9; SENATE COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss. TAX EXPENDI-
TURES, COMPENDIUM OF BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONs 51 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as TAx EXPENDITURES]. Accelerated depreciation methods for machinery
and equipment (other than the asset depreciation range election) are not included in the Tax
Expenditure Budget because it is assumed such items often decline in value more rapidly in
early years than in later years. See TAx EXPENDITURES, supra at 52.
8. Tables Prepared by Treasury Department for Chairman Edmund Muskie of Senate
Budget Committee Showing Distribution of "Tax Expenditures" Benefits Among Individual
Taxpayers by Income Categories, DAILY TAx REP., No. 29, J-20, J-21 (Feb. 10, 1978). Those
tables have a separate item for the tax subsidy given as accelerated depreciation on rental
housing ($320,000,000) and a separate item for the depreciation of other buildings in excess of
straight line ($140,000,000). The Tax Expenditure Budgets typically distinguish rental housing
from other buildings. For a list of budgets prepared by various arms of the government, see
Surrey & McDaniel, The Tax Expenditure Concept: Current Developments and Emerging Is-
sues, 20 B.C. L. REV. 225, 231 n.12 (1979).
9. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
10. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSIS, BUDGET OF THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT 158-59 (1978).
11. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§§ 3(a)(3), 101(c)(5), 102(a)(2), 88 Stat. 297. Section 601 of that Act (codified at 31 U.S.C.
1 (e) (1976)) requires the President to include tax expenditures as an item in the budget that he
submits to Congress.
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eral, who heads the General Accounting Office, urged Congress to
include the Code's tax expenditures in proposed "sunset" legislation,
so that they would expire after a stated period of time unless Con-
gress took positive action to retain them.'
2
The tax expenditure concept rests on the belief that there is a
"correct" definition of net income. Since the presumed purpose of a
net income tax system is to require persons to bear governmental
costs in proportion to their "ability to pay," the criteria used to meas-
ure net income should accurately reflect the differences in taxpayers'
abilities to pay. A tax expenditure occurs when the Code excludes or
deducts an item from gross income and the exclusion or deduction
does not comport with the "correct" definition of net income. The
original Treasury analysis stated that the tax expenditures listed in
the budget covered "the major respects in which the current income
tax bases deviate from widely accepted definitions of income and
standards of business accounting and from the generally accepted
structure of an income tax."'13 The Tax Expenditure Budget most
nearly rests' 4 on the Haig-Simons definition of net income which de-
fines personal income as "the algebraic sum of (1) the market value
of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of
the store of property rights between the beginning and the end of the
period in question."' 5 In other words, income equals personal con-
sumption plus accumulation of wealth over a stated period of time.
In preparing the Tax Expenditure Budget, the Treasury Department
does not adhere strictly to the Haig-Simons definition but rather
treats it as an "outer limit" that helps identify the items to be in-
cluded in the list of tax subsidies.' 6 While stressing that the Haig-
Simons definition is a useful analytical tool, the Treasury Depart-
ment acknowledges that "it is not suitable for all purposes and
would not, without modification, describe a satisfactory tax base."' 7
12. DAILY TAX REP. No. 135, at G-3 (July 12, 1979). See also H.R. 5858, 96th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1979), dscussedin DAILY TAX REP., No. 219, Nov. 9, 1979, at G-3, proposing that each
congressional committee be required to perform "sunset review" every two years on all tax
expenditures within its jurisdiction.
13. See S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 7, 12.
14. See id. at 12.
15. H.C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938). At 61-62, Simons discusses
some refinements of the definition of personal income tax. See also Haig, The Concept of
Income, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (R. Haig ed. 1921), reprinted in AMERICAN ECO-
NOMIC ASSOCIATION, READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 54 (1959).
16. U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 22 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as TREASURY BLUEPRINTS].
17. TREASURY BLUEPRINTS, supra note 16, at 22-23. See S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 12-
16; Surrey & Hellmuth, The Tax Expenditure Budget - Reply to Professor Bittker, 22 NATL.
TAX J. 528, 531 (1969).
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A number of items within the Haig-Simons definition of income
(and within the definition generally employed by economists) are in-
appropriate in a tax system, and so the tax expenditure budgets do
not treat the exclusion of such items from taxable income as a tax
preference. Later, we will examine several important exclusions
from taxable income that are necessary to a workable tax system,
even though such items fall within the definition of income em-
ployed by many economists. The reason that such differences exist is
that the "income" of a person is not measured in the same manner
for all purposes. For example, in determining a business's income
for tax purposes, the assets used in the business are depreciated on
the basis of their historical cost even if they will soon have to be
replaced at a much greater cost. On the other hand, a potential
buyer, considering whether the annual income stream from the busi-
ness justifies the asking price, will surely calculate depreciation on
the basis of the assets' replacement cost. That calculation will pro-
duce the net income that will be available after the existing assets are
replaced. An economist generally determines the cost of using an
item in a business as the value of the most profitable alternative use
to which the asset could be put, and a calculation of income on that
method is useful to the owner of the business in determining whether
it is advantageous to continue to operate that business or to shift to
another activity; but such a definition would be an inappropriate
means of measuring taxable income.
Professor Bittker has voiced a number of objections to the Tax
Expenditure Budget in his debates with Professors Surrey and
Hellmuth and others.' 8 In general, a consideration of the strengths
and fallacies of the Tax Expenditure Budget concept is outside the
scope of this Article, but one drawback of the Budget concept does
relate to the subject at hand. The promulgation of a list of "tax sub-
sidies" suggests that there is a widely accepted view of the correct
means of measuring income. While Professor Surrey acknowledges
that "the precise contours of the dividing line" are uncertain, he
notes that the tax expenditure concept rests on "a normative model
for an income tax structure - what receipts should be included and
what expenses allowed to obtain the proper measure of net income
for an income tax."'19 Even if the Haig-Simons definition were
18. See Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV.
L. REv. 925 (1967); Bittker, Accountingfor Federal "Tax Subsidies"in the National Budget, 22
NATL. TAx J. 244 (1969); Bittker, The Tax Expenditure Budget -A Reply to Professors Surreyv
and Hellmuth, 22 NATL. TAX. J. 538 (1969); Bittker, Income Tax "Loopholes" and Political
Rhetoric, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1099 (1973).
19. Surrey, Tax Incentives - Conceptual Criteriafor IdentXication and Comparison with
[Vol. 78:1
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adopted, it is not free of ambiguity and its application to many spe-
cific circumstances rests on value judgments over which many per-
sons will differ.20 Once the Treasury Department lists an item as a
tax expenditure, there is a substantial risk that congressional debate
on that item will be limited to the merits of subsidizing particular
behavior and will not investigate whether it offers a proper measure
of net income.
Reasonable men may well disagree about whether an item of de-
duction or exemption is a proper allowance to reflect a taxpayer's net
income. For example, Professor Andrews, while largely adopting
the Haig-Simons definition, disputed the inclusion in the Tax Expen-
diture Budget of the deductions allowed for medical expenses and
charitable contributions.21 Professor Surrey countered that Professor
Andrew's criticism does not rest on a proper construction of the
Haig-Simons definition but rather is premised on a model of income
that differs from the one "traditionally used by economists in struc-
turing an income tax." u22 It is surprising that Professor Surrey relied
on the economists' view of income, since only a few pages earlier in
his book he called that view too "novel" to be adopted in its entirety
in the Tax Expenditure Budget and approved of the Treasury De-
partment's reliance on "widely accepted definitions of income" and
the "generally accepted structure of an income tax."'2 3 Regardless of
whether Professor Surrey is correct, his exchange with Professor An-
drews focuses attention on another important aspect of the Tax Ex-
penditure Budget. Whether personal expenses such as medical fees,
theft losses, and casualty losses are proper deductions depends upon
the extent to which one believes that a person's taxable income
should be measured by the annual accretion to his distributable or
disposable wealth as contrasted to accretions to his wealth in gen-
eral.24 I believe (and some others do not) that deductions for such
items as theft and casualty losses are proper allowances to reflect the
taxpayer's true "ability to pay" (ie., his ability to share the costs of
Direct Government Expenditures, in TAX INCENTIVES 5 (1971), quotedin Surrey & Heilmuth,
supra note 17, at 531.
20. See Bittker, Accountingfor Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the National Budget, 22 NATL.
TAX J. 244, 260 (1969).
21. See Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309
(1972).
22. S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 20. See also Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited" Why
They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Farfrom Ideal World,
31 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1979).
23. See S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 18.
24. Professors Surrey and McDaniel maintain that "disposable income" is not a proper
measure of taxable income. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 8, at 260 n.88.
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government). The determination of the breadth or narrowness of the
deductions that should be allowed to measure net income properly
rests on an individual's value judgments. 25 Even if Andrews's model
of an ideal tax differs from the Haig-Simons model and from the
traditional view of economists, it may still be a better measure of
"ability to pay" than the traditional model.
The Haig-Simons definition of income is an algebraic sum that
includes "consumption." Professor Andrews construes "consump-
tion" more narrowly than Professor Surrey and probably more nar-
rowly than did Professor Simons. The question of which is the better
construction rests on value judgments whose selection should be sub-
ject to debate in Congress and in the tax literature. That debate
should not be stifled by the Treasury Department's formal designa-
tion of items as tax preferences on the latent premise that it has dis-
covered the true and correct "model" of net income. While the
Treasury Department does modify the items listed in its Budget from
time to time, the Budget perpetuates the value judgments held by
Treasury officials and cloaks them with an unwarranted indisputa-
bility.
Since the Treasury Department acknowledges that the Haig-
Simons definition does not describe a satisfactory tax base for a
workable tax system, and since the Treasury Department does not
adhere to the Haig-Simons definition in preparing the Tax Expendi-
ture Budget, how does it determine which departures from the Haig-
Simons model are tax expenditures and which are not? The Treas-
ury analysis states that it relies on "widely accepted definitions of
income" and the "generally accepted structure of an income tax."
'26
Those standards do not inspire confidence in the validity of the Tax
Expenditure Budget; they bear a distressing similarity to the familiar
but virtually useless standard that income should be determined ac-
cording to generally accepted accounting principles.27 Whatever the
validity of the Tax Expenditure Budget, it has become a powerful
political tool for the Treasury to focus congressional scrutiny on cer-
tain subjects and to narrow the scope of such scrutiny to the question
of whether an included item is an appropriate subsidy.
25. See McIntyre, .4 Solution to the Problem ofDfnlng a Tax Expenditure, (1980) (un-
published manuscript on file at Michigan Law Review).
26. S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 12, 18.
27. A statement by an accountant that he is reporting income according to generally ac-
cepted accounting principles is meaningful in that it represents that he complied with certain
established standards, But, these standards are of no help in construing an instrument that
directs that income is to be determined "according to generally accepted accounting practices,"
and that description is so vague as to have little significance.
[Vol. 78:1
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A number of items that are included within income under the
Haig-Simons definition are excluded from the Tax Expenditure
Budget because they are properly excluded from the tax base of an
income tax system geared to an individual's ability to pay for gov-
ernment. For example, imputed income from services that a tax-
payer performs for himself or from property (such as a residence)
that he owns and uses for personal enjoyment is properly excluded
from the income tax base even though such "income" increases the
taxpayer's net worth.28 Among the exceptions to the Haig-Simons
definition, two are especially relevant to this Article: the doctrine of
realization and the cash receipts and disbursement method of ac-
counting. 29 The various Tax Expenditure Budgets treat both the
doctrine of realization and the cash method as integral elements of
our tax system. The cash method can be characterized merely as an
application of the realization doctrine, but for analytical purposes it
is useful to treat those two as separate exceptions to Haig-Simons.
The doctrine of realization provides that the appreciation or de-
preciation in value of an asset will not be included in or deducted
from the income of the owner until the gain or loss is "severed" from
the asset. Thus where A owns a share of stock of the X Corporation,
no portion of the earnings of X will be included in A's income, even
if those earnings cause the value of A's share of X stock to increase,
until they are severed from A's share of stock by a corporate distri-
bution to 4. Similarly, the appreciation in value of A's share of X
stock will be included in A's income only when A severs the appreci-
ation of his capital (i e., realizes it) by selling the stock for more than
his basis. Thus, the unrealized appreciation of an asset is not in-
cluded in the owner's gross income, and, conversely, the unrealized
depreciation of an asset is not deductible from the owner's income.
An early Supreme Court decision 3o held that realization of gain was
a constitutional requisite to including the gain in income. While it is
28. See S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 12-13.
29. In PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM Professor Surrey states, at 23, that in preparing the
Tax Expenditure Budget "the Treasury analysis views the coexistence of the cash receipts and
accrual accounting methods as a part of the structure of an income tax system." In Surrey &
McDaniel, supra note 8, at 229, the authors quote from an address by Professor Surrey as
follows:
Since the Haig-Simons approach does not identify appropriate accounting techniques,
resort in establishing a normal structure is made to widely accepted "standards of business
accounting" used to determine income for financial reports. The application of these eco-
nomic and accounting norms is then tempered by also referring to the "generally accepted
structure of an income tax." This reference, it was pointed out, excluded as norniative the
inclusion of unrealized appreciation in asset values . . . since in the United States, and
largely elsewhere, these items are not commonly regarded as income for income tax pur-
poses though they fall within the economic definition of income.
30. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
November 1979]
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no longer believed that realization is constitutionally required, the
realization doctrine is good tax policy, and the doctrine is a basic
element of our income tax system. Except in a few situations involv-
ing the attribution of income from certain types of foreign corpora-
tions to United States shareholders,3t income is not taxed until it is
realized.
The realization doctrine is necessary both because measuring the
appreciation or depreciation in value of a taxpayer's assets every
year may be administratively difficult and because taxing unrealized
appreciation may be grossly unfair.32 The value of an asset can
change drastically in a short period of time,33 and so there is an arbi-
trariness to taxing a person on appreciation that existed at a given
instant, where the value the day before or the day after was quite
different. Where a taxpayer realizes a gain by severing it from an
asset, he permanently captures that gain; but the transitory rises and
dips in market price while a taxpayer holds an asset are not suffi-
ciently significant or permanent to warrant taxing him on such "pa-
per" wealth 34 or to warrant granting him a deduction for such
"paper" losses. The speculation involved in determining the value of
many types of assets aggravates the problem. The price for which an
owner can liquidate an asset often is substantially less than the theo-
retical market price: an owner typically cannot sell on a moment's
notice, and actual offers frequently differ from an expert's specula-
tion about the price that buyers will offer.
Taxing unrealized appreciation could also force a taxpayer to
dispose of an asset in order to raise the funds needed to pay the taxes
imposed on his paper gain.35 Unless the taxpayer has sufficient liq-
uid capital available, he would have to sell something, either the ap-
preciated asset or some other item. The current high rate of inflation
would make such a tax system especially onerous. Consider, for ex-
ample, the extraordinary increase in the price of housing that has
taken place in recent years. Taxing a homeowner on such apprecia-
tion at progressive income tax rates could be ruinous, even with a
31- See, e.g., I.R.C. § 551 (attributing the undistributed foreign personal holding company
income of a foreign personal holding company to its United States shareholders). See also
I.R.C. § 951.
32. See TREASURY BLUEPRINTS, supra note 16, at 47. See also note 29 supra.
33. The "volatility and transient character of market prices of a common stock" are illus-
trated in the Appendix to Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Ivan Allen Co. v. United
States, 422 U.S. 617, 653-58 (1975).
34. The unreliability of market quotations of common stock as an indicator of the "true"
or "realistic" value of such stock was discussed by Justice Powell in his dissenting opinion in
Ivan Allen, 422 U.S. at 646-49.
35. See TREASURY BLUEPRINTS, supra note 16, at 47.
[Vol. 78:1
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capital gains deduction. Indeed, the imposition of increasing prop-
erty taxes on such paper accretions of wealth apparently ignited the
taxpayer "revolt" that fostered California's Proposition 13.
The doctrine of realization is an integral part of our tax system,
and its desirability as a matter of tax policy is widely accepted. Sig-
nificantly for this Article, not even the Tax Expenditure Budget in-
cludes the failure to tax unrealized appreciation as a tax preference
or expenditure. Whether any other item of tax exclusion or deduc-
tion constitutes a tax preference depends upon whether it varies from
normal tax practice, including the requirement of realization. Thus,
if income is deferred because of the doctrine of realization, the defer-
ral is not a tax subsidy but rather a concomitant of a necessary ele-
ment of our tax system.
A second major exception to the Haig-Simons definition is the
authorization for certain taxpayers to use the cash receipts and dis-
bursements method of accounting (hereinafter referred to as the
"cash method"). 36 Most individual taxpayers and many entities use
the cash method. On the other hand, many businesses use the "ac-
crual method" of accounting. Under the accrual method, a taxpayer
takes an item of income into account when his right to that item
becomes fixed and the amount thereof can be determined with rea-
sonable accuracy, even if he will not receive that income until some
future date.37 Similarly, a taxpayer using the accrual method de-
ducts an item of expense when he becomes unconditionally obligated
for that expense and its amount can be determined with reasonable
accuracy, even if he does not have to pay the item for some time.38
A businessman needs to know whether he is operating at a profit or a
loss and he needs that information to be current so that he can locate
problem areas and correct them before he becomes insolvent. The
accrual method provides a more accurate picture of the current suc-
cess or failure of a business activity than does the cash method.39
Under the cash method, income is reported only when the tax-
payer actually or constructively receives cash or its equivalent. 4°
The taxpayer constructively receives income in a taxable year if he
36. See S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 23. Since the Haig-Simons approach does not specify
the accounting techniques, the cash method arguably is not an exception to that approach. In
any event, the Tax Expenditure Budgets do not treat the cash method as a tax preference.
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (1957).
38. Id.
39. The tax laws often (but not always) adhere to established business accounting prac-
tices. Thus, the Code permits, and in certain cases requires, the use of accrual accounting.
I.R.C. §§ 446, 447.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (1957).
November 1979]
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can draw upon it at some time during the year and if there is no
substantial restriction on his right to receive the income item during
that year.4 The cash method defers recognition of income until the
taxpayer actually or constructively receives payment. It is permitted
principally because it measures taxable income in a way that the
government may administer easily. Moreover, to require all taxpay-
ers to do the bookkeeping and accounting necessary to report their
income on the more sophisticated accrual method would impose too
great an expense on most individuals. And, as with the doctrine of
realization, it would impose a hardship on many individuals to re-
quire them to pay taxes on an accrued item of income that they will
not actually receive in hand for several years. Although Congress
has created several limited exceptions to its authorization of cash
method reporting,42 the cash method is an integral part of our tax
system.
Having expressed some skepticism about whether there is a sin-
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (1964).
42. One exception is the deferral permitted the vendor of certain types of properties on an
installment sale where the vendor elects to report the gain from that sale in installments.
I.R.C. § 453. (If installment reporting were not authorized, even a cash method vendor might
have to recognize all of the gain from an installment sale in the year of sale since, for example,
a secured promissory note of the purchaser may constitute the equivalent of cash and cause the
vendor to realize an amount equal to the fair market value of that note.) Another exception is
the treatment of original issue discount on a corporate bond or other corporate evidence of
indebtedness as described below.
Where a corporation issues a bond at a discount (ie., the price paid for the bond is less
than the amount payable at maturity), the amount of discount represents additional interest on
the bond. Since the early years of the income tax, a corporation which issues such a bond has
been required to report the discount as an interest deduction ratably over the term of the bond.
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.163-3(a) (1968); 1-163-4(a) (1971). In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, for the
stated purpose of providing parallel treatment to bondholders and the corporate debtor, S.
REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., 146-47 (1969), Congress amended § 1232 to require that
any holder of a corporate bond, or other corporate evidence of debt, that was issued with
original issue discount after May 27, 1969, report a proportionate part of the original issue
discount as income each year. There are some exceptions to this requirement. It does not
apply to bondholders of government bonds presumably because, as tax exempt entities, gov-
ernments do not deduct a portion of the original issue discount each year, and so the bond-
holder need not be required to report such income in order to obtain parallel treatment.
If parallel treatment is indeed the reason for requiring the ratable recognition of original
issue discount by a bondholder, it is a poor justification. Parallel treatment is not necessarily
desirable, and where different parties to a transaction utilize different accounting methods,
unparallel treatment often will occur and appears to be unobjectionable if the parties are unre-
lated. Transactions between related parties with different accounting methods might be under-
taken for tax avoidance reasons, and perhaps special restrictions should be imposed on such
transactions. For example, in § 267, Congress has imposed limitations on the deductibility of
interest and losses incurred on transactions between certain related parties that do not apply to
others.
Whatever the wisdom of requiring the pro-rata reporting of discount interest from corpo-
rate bonds, Congress has not expanded that exception to cash method reporting to other areas.
Since the cash method is also an integral part of our tax system, an exclusion of an item from
the income of a cash method taxpayer can constitute a tax "preference" only if the exclusion
rests on some ground other than a deferral provided by the cash method itself.
[Vol. 78:1
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gle "true" definition of income, I should make clear that I do not
consider the term meaningless. As noted above,43 income is a nar-
rower concept for tax purposes than it is for purposes of economic
theory, and income is a value-laden concept. In general, for tax pur-
poses "income" refers to net income - gross receipts less certain
deductions and set-offs. Fortunately, depreciation, which is the fo-
cus of this Article, is not a personal expense and is relatively free
from the value judgments that adhere to questions of deductibility of
personal expenses.44 Thus, almost all scholars agree that a person
who expends money to acquire an asset that will produce income
over a period of time should be allowed to recover the cost of his
investment as an offset against the income earned from it. The con-
troversy over depreciation has instead centered on the proper
method of cost recovery, specifically the extent to which capital re-
covery may be "accelerated." With this Article, I hope to illuminate
that controversy more clearly.
It will be easier to determine whether a specific method of cost
recovery is proper for the measurement of taxable income after a
brief review of the reasons for allowing recovery at all. As we shall
see, no method of cost recovery is exclusively correct, but rather a
range of methods are all conceptually defensible, although some
may be appropriate more often than others. The proper allocation
of cost depends upon estimates of such matters as: the useful life of
an asset; the income stream to be produced by the asset; and salvage
value. Frequently, these "estimates" are merely very rough guesses.
It is unlikely that any one method of recovery will be the singly cor-
rect one when it must operate with such imprecise data. For that
and other reasons, the tax law usually permits a taxpayer to elect any
of several methods, so that he can tailor the method to fit more
closely his particular circumstances. In determining whether a cost
recovery method is appropriate for a particular circumstance, I shall
often examine closely analogous circumstances where that method of
cost recovery is accepted without challenge. Whether or not the
method is the very best method available, it cannot be inappropriate
unless it is inappropriate in the analogous circumstance or some
meaningful distinction between the two circumstances can be found.
This Article studies the extent to which accelerated depreciation
accurately reflects net income. It does so by reference to the tradi-
tional yardsticks against which we must scrutinize all cost recovery
43. See text following note 17 supra.
44. See text at note 24 supra.
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methods: the goal of measuring an individual's ability to pay the
costs of government and the constraints accepted as essential to our
tax system, including the doctrine of realization and the cash method
of accounting. The current view, which appears to be held almost
universally, is that accelerated depreciation is a tax subsidy; some
commentators have suggested that even straight line depreciation of-
fers an inappropriately large deduction in the early years of an item's
use.45 The popular analysis rests on two related premises:
1) the depreciation deduction for an asset should not exceed the dif-
ference between the taxpayer's basis in the asset at the beginning
of the year and the asset's fair-market value at the end of the year,
and
2) so-called "sinking fund depreciation" - the difference between
the present value of an asset's projected income stream at the be-
ginning of the year and the present value of the asset's projected
income stream, taken at the end of the year - is the economically
accurate measure of depreciation.
Those premises have been partially integrated into the Tax Ex-
penditure Budget in that it lists the excess of accelerated depreciation
on buildings over straight line and the additional depreciation ob-
tained through asset depreciation range46 as a tax expenditure. The
thesis of this Article is that some amount of accelerated depreciation
(although not necessarily the full amount allowable under all of the
provisions of the Code) is a proper deduction in determining net in-
come and provides a more accurate statement of net income than
straight line or decelerated depreciation methods. At the very least,
accelerated depreciation provides a deduction that is no less appro-
priate than straight line or decelerated methods.
Finding a conceptual justification for accelerated depreciation
has several important implications. First, the perspective shifts for
challenges to even the most extreme forms of accelerated deprecia-
tion. Second, the Tax Expenditure Budgets overstate the amount of
tax expenditure for accelerated depreciation and its very inclusion in
the Budgets is questionable. Third, the current limitations on the
availability of accelerated depreciation for buildings are unjustified
and should be reconsidered. Fourth, Congress should repeal the in-
clusion in sections 57(a)(2) and (3) of the accelerated depreciation on
buildings and certain other properties as tax preference items. Fifth,
Congress should repeal the statutory prohibition against reducing a
corporation's earnings and profits by the accelerated portion of a de-
45. See, e.g., M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 6.07, at 133-35 (2d ed.
1979); Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 8, at 243 n.38.
46. See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
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preciation deduction. Sixth, the current provisions for recapture of
depreciation deductions on the disposition of an asset47 are concep-
tually vulnerable, especially to the extent that straight line deprecia-
tion is recaptured. Finally, we have more reason to doubt the
propriety of a bureaucratically defined Tax Expenditure Budget; if
the Budget inhibits rational discussion in Congress of Code provi-
sions' worth as matters of tax policy, it does far more harm than
good.
II. THE DEFINITION AND FUNCTION OF DEPRECIATION -
A PRIMER
Before examining sinking fund depreciation and the question of
the appropriateness of accelerated methods, a primer on deprecia-
tion may be helpful. Those readers well-versed in the traditional
theory and methods of cost recovery through depreciation might like
to skip to Section III.
A. Cost Recovery
Where a taxpayer incurs a current expense in connection with his
trade or business, he usually will be allowed to deduct that expense
during the tax year in which he pays or accrues it.48 So, for example,
the cost a retail business incurs in advertising for the sale of its goods
is a current deduction. However, the cost of purchasing an asset to
be used for more than twelve months is usually not currently deduct-
ible.49 In theory, the taxpayer has not actually spent the dollars he
paid for such an asset but rather has converted them into a different
type of property. For example, if T buys a typewriter at a cost of
$800 in Year One and if T expects to use the typewriter in his busi-
ness for five years, he cannot deduct the $800 cost of the typewriter
in Year One since he acquired an asset of like value.
But i's typewriter will not last forever. Each year, a portion of
the useful life of the typewriter will be exhausted until, after five
years, the typewriter is no longer useful. In effect, each year that T
uses the typewriter, T uses up a portion of the $800 that he paid for
it. An accurate measurement of T's net income for any one of those
years will include a deduction of some amount to represent the por-
tion of the $800 cost that is properly allocable to that year. The allo-
cation of the cost of a capital asset over the years in which the asset is
47. I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250.
48. I.R.C. § 162. See also I.R.C. § 212.
49. I.R.C. § 263(a).
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employed is accomplished by a depreciation allowance.50 For tax
purposes, depreciation is the amortization 5' of the cost of an asset
over the period that the owner employs it in a profit-seeking activ-
ity. 5 2 During each year of the asset's useful life, the taxpayer deducts
a portion of the asset's cost from his income, and reduces his basis
accordingly.
53
The present depreciation laws allow a cost recovery by allocating
a deduction to each year of useful life, whether or not the amount so
allocated exceeds the amount earned from the asset in that year. If a
year's depreciation deduction exceeds that year's "income" from the
property, the taxpayer may use the excess deduction against other
income. Whether Congress should restrict depreciation deductions
to an amount equal to the income from the depreciable property is a
separate issue that I will not discuss in this Article.
The principal controversy over depreciation turns upon the
methods employed to allocate the cost or basis of the asset over the
life of the asset. If the taxpayer recovers part of the cost of the asset
earlier than is proper (i e., if too much depreciation is allowed in the
early years of the asset's use), the taxpayer obtains a benefit to the
extent of the tax reduction caused by the excessive deduction. The
unwarranted depreciation deduction might never be recaptured;
even if it is recaptured, the taxpayer receives the use of the extra tax
reduction dollars until the excessive deduction is recaptured. The
taxpayer gains the value of deferring the tax until a later date, and
the dollar benefit of a tax deferral can be quite substantial.54 So, the
50. The tax laws have always provided for a depreciation deduction. See Act of Oct. 3,
1913, ch. 16, §§ II(B), II(6)(b), 38 Stat. 167, 172.
51. Depreciation is a type of amortization, and the terms are sometimes used interchange-
ably. Confusion may be caused because the tax law often employs these terms differently. For
tax purposes, the term "depreciation" refers to an amortization deduction that is allowable
under § 167. On the other hand, the phrase "amortization in lieu of depreciation" or some
special form of amortization refers to an item of amortization that is deductible under a Code
section other than § 167.
52. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, % 2.01, at 24-32.
53. Not all assets have fixed useful lives, and therefore not all assets are depreciable. If a
taxpayer purchases a nondepreciable capital asset (such as a share of corporate stock), he may
recover his cost before he must recognize a gain on the sale of the asset; but with few excep-
tions, he may not recover the cost until he disposes of the asset. Thus, if a shareholder receives
dividends on a share of stock, the entire amount received is treated as income from the share-
holder's capital (Ie., not as a recovery of his cost). Since the share of stock has no ascertain-
able useful life, the shareholder's investment is treated as continuing in perpetuity, and the
shareholder can recover his cost only by selling the share or by having it redeemed by the
corporation. (In certain circumstances, where a distributing corporation has insufficient earn-
ings and profits, a corporate distribution to a shareholder can constitute a return of his capital,
but there are reasons for that treatment that do not contradict the principle described above.
See D. KAHN, BASIC CORPORATE TAXATION 13-15, 20-25 (1973)).
54. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 1 6.07, at 132-33. See also M. ALCHIAN & W.
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question of the proper allocation of cost (i e., the depreciation
method) is extremely important. Its importance is enhanced even
further by its effect on the propriety of recapturing depreciation.
55
B. Elements of Depreciation
Before considering the various methods of depreciation, we
should first examine the three basic elements that affect the computa-
tion of depreciation: basis, useful life, and salvage value.
The "basis" of an asset is the cost of that asset for tax purposes.
It therefore determines the total amount that a taxpayer may recover
through depreciation. While basis often is the asset's actual cost to
the taxpayer, it may also be acquired through other means. The ba-
sis of an asset acquired by gift is equal to the donor's basis plus part
of the gift taxes paid. A taxpayer must adjust his basis in an asset at
various times; for example, basis is reduced by no less than the
amount of depreciation allowable, whether or not the taxpayer actu-
ally claimed a deduction and whether or not he obtained a tax bene-
fit. The basis of an asset at a given point in time is usually referred
to as the "adjusted basis" of the asset.
Under the Crane doctrine,56 a purchaser's basis in an asset he
acquired subject to an encumbrance includes the amount of the en-
cumbrance. Since each depreciation method is applied to the asset's
basis, such a taxpayer may deduct costs that he has not yet paid -
leverage that is the keystone of many tax shelters. The various pro-
posals to prevent the use of such leverage where the taxpayer is not
personally liable to repay the debt secured by the encumbrance are
worthy of much analysis, but this Article studies methods of depreci-
ation; the question of how best to determine depreciable basis will
have to be dealt with elsewhere.
The "useful life" of an asset is the amount of time that the tax-
payer expects to use the asset in his business. The useful life may be
shorter than the asset's physical life, since the taxpayer may expect to
use the asset in his business for less than its physical life. For exam-
ple, car rental businesses may use cars for less than two years be-
cause of their customers' demand to rent only new cars.
A depreciable asset is depreciated over its useful life. Of course,
the taxpayer's estimate of useful life is merely a guess, and the ira-
ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 144-49
(2d ed. 1977).
55. See Section V infra.
56. The Crane doctrine is named after the landmark case of Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1 (1947).
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precision of such a guess has led to many disputes between the IRS
and taxpayers. In 1971, Congress tried to minimize such disputes by
allowing taxpayers to measure useful life under the asset deprecia-
tion range (ADR) system. One of the most important consequences
of electing ADR is that if a taxpayer adopts a useful life for his assets
in a range between 20% below and 20% above the life stated in a
guideline promulgated by the IRS,57 that life is conclusively deemed
acceptable. As previously stated, the Treasury Department treats the
ADR election as a tax expenditure. The ADR election is not avail-
able for buildings placed into service after the year 1973.58
The "salvage value" of an asset is the estimated amount for
which the owner can sell the asset at the end of its useful life. The
owner estimates salvage value when he first puts the asset into serv-
ice. The salvage estimate is not revised periodically because of
changes in market conditions. If the useful life of an asset is redeter-
mined after it is placed into service, the salvage value must also be
redetermined at that time. In determining the depreciation for cer-
tain personal properties, a taxpayer can elect to reduce salvage value
by up to 10% of the asset's adjusted basis.
59
Salvage value can affect depreciation in several ways. Under sev-
eral methods of depreciation, the depreciation rate is applied to the
difference between the basis of the asset and its salvage value. And
under all methods, the taxpayer may never take so much deprecia-
tion that he would reduce his adjusted basis below the asset's salvage
value. Salvage value also plays an important role in determining
whether there is a single "proper" method of depreciation, and it is
discussed in greater detail in Section IV of this Article.
C. Methods of Depreciation
A taxpayer may depreciate each asset separately (item deprecia-
tion) or in groups (multiple asset depreciation). Whether the tax-
payer depreciates each item separately or whether he uses multiple
asset groupings, he may choose among several permissible methods
of depreciation to determine the appropriate rate. The three most
commonly employed methods are "straight line," "declining bal-
ance," and "sum of the years-digits."
"Straight line" depreciation is determined by reducing the tax-
payer's basis in the property by its salvage value and dividing the
57. I.R.C. § 167(m); Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-ll(b)(4) (1971).
58. Rev. Proc. 77-3, 1977-1 C.B. 535.
59. I.R.C. § 167(f).
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difference by the useful life of the property. Under the straight line
method, an equal amount of depreciation is allowable each full year.
The percentage rate of depreciation under the straight line method is
determined by dividing 100% by the useful life of the property.
Thus, an asset with a five-year useful life will have a constant
straight line rate of depreciation of 20%.
Accelerated depreciation methods accelerate the recovery of cost
above the straight line rate by granting larger depreciation deduc-
tions in the earlier years of an asset's use than are allowed in the
later years. Unlike straight line depreciation, which is available for
all depreciable properties, accelerated methods may be used only for
certain types of tangible properties.60 Decelerated methods of depre-
ciation provide less depreciation in the early years of an asset's use
than in the later years.
"Declining balance" is an accelerated method of depreciation.
Under the declining balance method, a multiple of the straight line
percentage rate for the asset is multiplied times the adjusted basis of
the asset, determined as of the beginning of the taxable year for
which the depreciation deduction is allowable. The type of declining
balance method is determined by the multiple of the straight line
rate that is employed. Double declining balance (also referred to as
200% declining balance) uses a rate that is twice the straight line
rate.61 Declining balance depreciation is computed without regard
to salvage value, except that the aggregate amount of depreciation
deductions that are allowable cannot exceed the difference between
adjusted basis and salvage value. Taxpayers may use double declin-
ing balance only for certain types of properties, and to qualify, the
taxpayer must be the first person to use the property. Another popu-
lar form is 150% declining balance, which uses a rate equal to 1.5
times the straight line rate. Taxpayers may use the 150% declining
balance method for new buildings and for new or used tangible per-
60. A few types of properties, including some intangibles, may receive rapid amortization.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 177, allowing the amortization of the cost of acquiring a trademark or trade
name over a 60-month period.
61. The following example illustrates the operation of double declining balance deprecia-
tion. On January 1 of Year One, R purchased a new machine to be used in his business. The
machine cost R $5000, had a useful life of 5 years and a salvage value of $800. The straight
line rate is 20%, and so the double declining balance rate is 40%. The first year's depreciation
for the machine is 40% x $5000 = $2000. The adjusted basis of the machine as of Janiary I of
Year Two is $3000 ($5000 minus the $2000 depreciation allowed for Year One). So the depre-
ciation for Year Two is 40% x $3000 = $1200. The depreciation for Year Three is 40% x $1800
= $720; and so on except that the aggregate amount of depreciation cannot exceed $4200
($5000 minus the salvage value) assuming that the taxpayer did not elect to reduce salvage
value to $300 pursuant to I.R.C. § 167(f).
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sonalty.62
The sum of the years-digits is an accelerated method that is avail-
able only for certain new personalty and for new residential rental
realty. Under the sum of the years-digits method, a fraction is multi-
plied times the original basis of the asset (determined as of the date
that the asset was put into service), reduced by salvage value. The
numerator of the fraction is equal to the number of years of useful
life remaining for the asset, and the denominator is equal to the sum
of the digits from one through the asset's useful life (determined as
of the date that the asset was first put into service). Thus, for an asset
with a useful life of five years, the denominator is equal to 15 (5 + 4
+ 3 + 2 + 1); the fraction for the first year is 5/15, the fraction for
the second year is 4/15, the fraction for the third year is 3/15, and so
on. At the end of the five-year useful life, 15/15 or 100% of the de-
preciable amount (basis less salvage value) will have been allowed.
In lieu of making the computation described above, the regulations
provide a table for making the computation in a somewhat simpler
manner.6
3
Other accelerated methods are available,64 but taxpayers most
commonly use declining balance and sum of the years-digits. The
Code imposes greater restrictions on the use of accelerated methods
for realty than for personalty.65 Land is not a depreciable asset, but
buildings are depreciable. The same accelerated methods are avail-
able for new residential rental realty (residential rental realty for
which the taxpayer is the first user) as are available for tangible per-
sonalty.66 Other new depreciable realty, however, can be depreci-
ated only on the straight line method, or on a 150% declining
balance method, or on some method (other than the sum of the
years-digits) that provides no greater amount of depreciation deduc-
tions than 150% declining balance during the first two-thirds of the
62. 125% declining balance is also used, principally for used residential rental realty.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-3(a)(2) (1956).
64. Two important ones are the units of production method and the income forecast
method. Under the units of production method, the taxpayer estimates the number of units
that will be produced by an asset, then allocates a proportionate amount of his cost less sal-
vage to each unit. The income forecast method is used principally by persons owning and
leasing TV or movie films. Rev. Rul. 64-273, 1964-2 C.B. 62. Such assets typically earn the
bulk of their income in the first year or two of use, after which the amount of rental income
drops dramatically. Under the income forecast method, a taxpayer is allowed a depreciation
deduction equal to a fraction of the difference between his "cost" and salvage value. The
numerator of the fraction is equal to the amount of income earned from the film that year and
the denominator is equal to the total amount of income that the taxpayer estimates will be
earned by the film over its useful life. Rev. Rul. 60-358, 1960-2 C.B. 68.
65. I.R.C. § 167(j).
66. I.R.C. § 167(j)(2)(A). Residential rental property is defined in I.R.C. § 167(j)(2)(B).
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asset's useful life.67 No accelerated method at all may be applied to
used realty unless it is used residential rental realty having a useful
life of at least twenty years, in which case the taxpayer may use the
125% declining balance method (or some method that provides no
greater amount of depreciation during the first two thirds of the as-
set's useful life).
68
III. COST RECOVERY FOR ANNUITIES AND FOR THE
INSTALLMENT COLLECTIONS OF LOANS
To analyze depreciation properly, it is usefful first to consider the
cost recovery methods that best reflect the income earned from an
annuity contract and from the collection of principal and interest on
an outstanding loan. In Section IV of this Article, I will draw paral-
lels between the cost recovery treatment of those items and the con-
ceptual justification for accelerated depreciation.
A. Annuities
In the broadest sense, an annuity is a right to receive payments at
periodic intervals. For income tax purposes, the regulations define
the phrase "amounts received as an annuity" as "amounts which are
payable at regular intervals over a period of more than one full year
from the date on which they are deemed to begin, provided that the
total of the amounts so payable or the period for which they are to be
paid can be determined as of that date."'69 An annuity may either be
"for life," of the annuitant or of anyone else, or it may be "for
years": a fixed dollar amount payable periodically for a fixed
number of years. In this discussion, I shall consider only the type of
annuity that is purchased from an insurance company, and I shall
concentrate on the annuity for years, payable annually. The cost of
an annuity contract that provides for such annual payments is sim-
pler to calculate than the cost of an annuity that is payable at more
frequent intervals or the cost of an annuity for life, but the cost re-
covery principles applicable to all annuities are essentially the same.
I will also assume that (as usually is the case) the annuitant cannot
surrender the annuity contract to the company prior to maturity.
Suppose D purchases an annuity contract to pay her $1,000 per
year for five years, and in exchange D pays the insurance company a
lump sum single payment. The insurance company will hold the
67. I.R.C. § 1670)(1).
68. I.R.C. § 167(j)(4), 0)(5).
69. Treas. Reg. 1.72-1(b) (1956).
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premium and return it to P in five annual installments. The unre-
turned balance will earn income for the company, and so it is willing
to pay D interest for the use of her funds. Thus, the aggregate
amount paid to D over the five-year annuity period will be greater
than D's premium, and the difference constitutes the income that D
earns on her investment in the annuity. Since the company pays D
in fixed annual installments, it is necessary to determine the amount
of each annuity payment to P that is a recovery of her capital invest-
ment (ie., a recovery of her cost) and the amount that is income to
her.
We know the total amount the company will pay to D and (since
we know the amount of premium she paid) we know what part of the
total is a recovery of cost and what part is income. But to tax D's
income properly, we must determine the timing for the recovery of
her cost and for the recognition of income. Should all of the pay-
ments be treated as a recovery of D's cost until she recovers her pre-
mium, and then all subsequent payments be treated as income?
Should all payments be treated as income until D receives the full
amount of income to which she is entitled, and then all subsequent
payments be treated as a recovery of her cost? Or should a portion
of each annuity payment be treated as a recovery of D's cost and a
portion treated as income, and if so, how should those portions be
determined?
It is interesting to note how the tax law deals with these ques-
tions. Since 1954, the Code has treated a portion of each annuity
payment as a recovery of cost and a portion as income.70 The Code
allocates payments between cost recovery and income to exclude an
equal percentage of each payment as a cost recovery and to treat a
constant percentage of each payment as taxable income.71 The por-
tion of each annuity payment that is excluded is computed by divid-
ing the annuitant's investment in the annuity contract by the
aggregate amount of annuity payments that the annuitant expects to
70. Prior to 1954, the tax treatment of annuities was quite different. Initially, the tax law
treated all of the annuity payments as a return of capital until the annuitant recovered the full
cost and treated all additional payments as income. In 1934, Congress changed the tax law to
provide that the annuitant treat 3% of each annuity payment as income and the balance as a
recovery of cost until he fully recovers his costs, after which he must treat all of the payments
as income. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 2.02, at 33.
71. A different method of allocation is applied in the case of an annuity provided by an
employer where the employee's own investment in the annuity is so small that the aggregate
amount payable under the annuity within three years after payment commences is equal to or
exceeds the employee's investment. In such cases, the employee excludes the annuity pay-
ments from income until he recovers his cost and thereafter treats the payments as income.
I.R.C. § 72(d). This is a de minimis rule to avoid the administrative nuisance of allocating cost
among a number of annuity payments where the amount of cost recovery is relatively small.
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receive (the "expected return").72 In the case of an annuity for years
where the payments are of equal amounts, the expected return is
equal to the amount of the annual annuity payment times the
number of payments the company will make.73 Thus, if D buys a
five-year annual annuity, she will exclude 1/5 of the premium cost
from her gross income each year. D recovers her cost ratably over
the five annual payments and also allocates her interest ratably over
the five-year period.
In his excellent primer on federal income taxation, Professor
Chirelstein questions whether the current tax treatment of annuity
payments is sensible.74 Professor Chirelstein reasons that the current
system permits a deferral of income (and in the case of an annuity
for life, there may be a forgiveness of income) in that it allows the
annuitant to recover a larger portion of his cost in the early years of
the annuity than Chirelstein believes appropriate. He points out that
an annuitant is in the same position as a lender who has loaned
money to be repaid in installments with interest. He states, "As any-
one knows who has ever paid off a home mortgage, interest always
bulks very large in the early years (with repayment of principal cor-
respondingly small), while the reverse relationship holds true of pay-
ments towards the end."17 5 He concludes that the purpose of
permitting an even distribution of the recovery of cost is to provide
roughly constant after-tax income for the annuitant and to prevent
annuitants for life from incurring larger tax bills when they are older
and would find it difficult to adjust their standard of living to a de-
creasing amount of net income. Thus, "[i]n this latter respect, § 72 is
simply one of a jumble of tax relief measures whose purpose is to
give assistance to the aged ....
Although that view has merit insofar as it relates to the treatment
of annuity payments made under an annuity for life contract to an
annuitant who has outlived his life expectancy, 77 Professor Chirel-
stein errs, although admittedly quite lucidly, when he asserts that an
annuitant actually receives more interest income in the early years of
payment than in the later years. Professor Chirelstein points to the
treatment of mortgage installment payments as evidence in support
of his conclusion, but his argument rests on two unsupported as-
72. I.R.C. § 72(b).
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-5(c) (1956).
74. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 2.02, at 34-35.
75. Id. at 34.
76. Id. at 35.
77. See text at notes 86-88 infra.
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sumptions: first, that the practice of allocating larger amounts of in-
terest to the earlier mortgage payments is an accurate method of
reflecting interest income, and second, that it is the only accurate
method of reporting such interest income. We will examine the
proper treatment of installment repayments of loans later, but first
let us examine directly the proper treatment of annuity payments.
To do so, we must understand how the cost (or premium) for an
annuity contract is determined. Consider the following example:
On March 1 of Year Zero, X (who reports her income on the
cash method) determines that she would like to have $1 paid to her
one year later (on March 1 of Year One). X asks the Friendly Insur-
ance Company what amount they would charge her now, on March
1 of Year Zero, to provide her with a contractual right to receive $1
on March 1 of Year One. The company first determines what rate of
interest it will pay for the use of X's money. Let us assume that the
company will pay interest at a 6% rate compounded annually. The
company then calculates the amount which invested at a 6% rate for
one year will yield $1 at the end of the year - that is, the original
investment plus the 6% interest will total $1. In effect, the company
discounts $1 at a 6% rate to determine thepresent value of the right
to receive $1 one year hence. This amount (the present value of $1)
can either be computed algebraically 78 or the amount can be deter-
mined under tables provided for convenience of computation. 79 The
present value of $1 discounted for one year at a 6% rate is 94.3¢; if
94.3¢ is invested at 6%, it will yield 5.70 at the end of the year, which
will provide an aggregate of $1 in principal plus interest. When X"
receives $1 on March 1 of Year One, she will have income of 60, and
94¢ will be a return of her capital. So, rounding off the 94.30 figure,
the company will charge X a premium of 940 for the right to receive
$1 one year later.
After thinking over the company's proposal, X" decides that she
does not really need $1 one year from now, but instead wishes to
receive $1 two years later, on March 1 of Year Two. X asks the
company how much she must pay now to acquire the right to $1 in
two years. To compute that amount, the company discounts $1 at a
6% compounded rate for two years. The resulting figure, 89€, is the
present value at a 6% compounded rate of $1 payable two years later.
78. The present value (P) of a stated amount (A) one year hence is equal to the result of
dividing the stated amount (A) by an amount equal to 1 plus the rate of discount (r). So our
formulaAisP= In the example in the text A = $1 and r = 6%. So, P = °-$194.3¢. l+r 1.06
79. See, e.g., M. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 54, at 148, Table 7-1.
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Again, the present value can be determined either algebraically 8° or
by resorting to tables which have already made those calculations.8
So X must pay the company 89¢; and when she receives a $1 pay-
ment two years later, she will receive .11¢ of income and 890 as a
return of her capital.
82
After further reflection, X decides that she would prefer to
purchase the right to receive $1 three years later, on March 1 of Year
Three. The company informs X that the cost of a right to $1 in three
years is 84¢. If X purchases the right to that dollar, she will receive
16¢ of income in Year Three, and the remaining 84¢ of the dollar she
receives will be a return of her capital.
X' finally decides that what she really wants is to have $1 paid to
her one year later (on March 1 of Year One), an additional $1 paid
to her two years later (on March 1 of Year Two) and a final dollar
paid to her three years later (on March 1 of Year Three). She wants
an annuity of $1 per year for three years. The cost of that annuity is
easily computed. The company merely adds together the costs
(which were computed above) for the right to $1 in one year (94¢), in
two years (89¢), and in three years (840).83 The total of those three
present values is $2.67, which is the cost to X of an annuity of $1 per
year for three years.84 It may be helpful to set forth the foregoing
information in tabular form.
Amount Interest Return of
Years Cost Received Received Capital
(March 1, Year One) 1st 94¢ $1 6¢ 940
(March 1, Year Two) 2nd 890 $1 111€ 894
(March 1, Year Three) 3rd 84T $1 16¢ 84¢
$2.67 $3 33¢, $2.67
A cursory glance at the above table is sufficient to see that the
80. The formula for computing the present value, (P) at a compounded rate (r)-of a stated
amount (A) payable at a future date is P = A where t = the number of years in the future(l+r)t
in which the payment is to be made. In the example above, where $1 is to be paid two years_$1 $I 8¢
later, the formula is: P = 1 -- = $1 - =
81. See note 79 supra. (1.06) 
1.12
82. Since Xhas an unrestricted right to the 5¢ of interest income that was earned at the end
of Year One (6% of 89¢ is about 5¢), 5¢ of the 1 € interest received in Year Two may well have
accrued in Year One under accrual basis reporting. But, X reports her income on the cash
method, and so none of the interest is reported by her until she receives it in Year Two. More-
over, since X has no right to surrender the annuity contract to the insurance company in Year
One and thereby obtain possession of the 51 of interest earned in that year, there is no possibil-
ity of r's having constructively received the interest in Year One. As noted in Section I supra,
the cash method of reporting income is an integral part of our tax system. The exclusion from
.'s Year One income of the 50 of accrued but unpaid interest is not a tax subsidy or prefer-
ence; it is merely normal income measurement under the cash method.
83. See M. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 54, at 149.
84. See id at 149, 151, & 152, Table 7-3.
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portion of the annuity payments that constitutes interest income to X
is less in the early years of payout than in the later years, and con-
versely a greater portion of the early annuity payments constitutes a
recovery of X's cost. But is it appropriate to compartmentalize the
annual annuity payments so that the cost of each year's payment is
separately computed and deemed to be recovered in the year of pay-
ment? For example, after the expiration of one year, the interest, at
a 6% rate, on the entire $2.67 paid by Xis 16. Should, as Professor
Chirelstein asserts is conceptually correct, the entire 16 of accrued
interest be treated as having been paid to X on March 1 of Year One
so that only 84¢ of the $1 she received on that date is to be treated as
a recovery of her cost? In my view, it should not. There is no com-
pelling reason to allocate to X's payment in Year One the income
earned on money paid for the right to receive annuity payments in
Years Two and Three.
Stating it slightly differently, of the $1 payment that X received
in Year One, 940 is a return of her capital and 60 is interest. Of the
160 interest earned on X's $2.67 premium, 100 of that amount repre-
sents accrued but unpaid interest. But since X" reports on the cash
method of accounting, the 100 of accrued but unpaid interest should
not be taxable to her.
Consider the following alternative for . Instead of purchasing a
three-year annuity contract from the Friendly Insurance Company,
suppose she pays them 94¢ for the right to receive $1 one year later.
X then travels across town to the rival Cheerful Insurance Com-
pany, and she pays them 89¢ for the right to receive $1 two years
later. X then visits a third company, the Neighborly Insurance Com-
pany, and she pays them 840 for the right to receive $1 three years
later. In that circumstance, there is no doubt that X will recognize
60 of income in Year One, 1 110 of income in Year Two, and 16€ of
income in Year Three. Surely the economics of the transaction are
not altered if X purchases the right to the three years of annual pay-
ments from a single insurance company. The tax consequences
ought to be the same whether X uses one insurance company or
three companies.
It is likely true that Congress provided in the tax law for an equal
allocation of the return of an annuitant's capital over the annuity
payments for nonrevenue policy reasons. The apparent purpose, as
noted above, is to maintain an approximately equal amount of after-
tax dollars for the annuitant so that no radical adjustments need be
made in the annuitant's life style as would occur if the rate of recov-
ery were to change every year. However, contrary to Professor
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Chirelstein's assertion that the current tax law grants a deferral to
the annuitant, we have seen a strong case for the proposition that the
tax law requires the annuitant to report more income in the early
years of payment than is actually attributable to those payments.
Nevertheless, there is a colorable claim that the interest income
to an annuitant should be allocated so as to decrease with each pay-
ment. Arguably, the purchase of an annuity from one insurance
company can be treated as a single investment and need not be di-
vided into multiple purchases for successive annuity payments
merely because the annuitant could have purchased the right to each
annual payment separately.85 The arguable justifiability, however,
of allocating all accrued interest to each annuity payment is a far cry
from proof that such an allocation is the onoy permissible method of
reporting income. At the very least, the case for treating a cash
method annuitant's taxable income as increasing each year is as
strong as the case for treating it as decreasing each year. The scheme
that Congress adopted in section 72 can be regarded as a justifiable
compromise between those two polar positions. Obviously, Congress
had no such compromise in mind when it adopted section 72, but the
Code's position midway between two acceptable theses suggests that
it adequately comports with economic reality. In any event, as indi-
cated above, I find the case for an increasing rate of taxable income
to a cash method annuitant to be overwhelming, and so if there is
any "subsidy" in that aspect of section 72, it is from the annuitant to
the government.
Before departing from the subject of annuities, a brief considera-
tion of the tax treatment of an annuity for life is in order. Under
section 72, the portion of a payment under an annuity for life con-
tract that is to be excluded as a recovery of capital is computed in the
same manner as is done for an annuity for years. One difference is
that the expected return from an annuity for life contract must be
estimated, whereas the amount of return from an annuity for years
contract usually is certain.86 The expected return from an annuity
for life contract is determined by using the life expectancy of the
annuitant, as provided in tables set forth in the regulations.
87
If an annuitant dies precisely at the expiration of his life expec-
85. Cf. Meyer v. United States, 364 U.S. 410 (1960) (6-3 decision) (annuity for years and
contingent life annuity, payable as settlement of a single life insurance "policy," are treated as
single "property" for purposes of marital deduction).
86. Under certain circumstances, however, a contract may provide for an increase in the
interest rate.
87. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-5(a) (1956). The tables are set forth at Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9 (1954).
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tancy, during his life he will have recovered the exact amount of his
cost and will have reported the balance of the payments made to him
as income. If an annuitant dies prior to attaining his life expectancy,
he will not recover his cost, but nevertheless the Code permits no loss
deduction. If an annuitant outlives his life expectancy, he may con-
tinue to exclude from income the same portion of each payment
made after the expiration of his life expectancy as he would have
excluded if the payment had been made prior to that date.88 This
current position of continuing the exclusion ratio after the annuitant
has recovered all of his cost constitutes a change from the pre-1954
Code, under which all payments in excess of the annuitant's cost
were treated as income. The likely reason for continuing the exclu-
sion ratio is the previously stated policy of maintaining a roughly
constant amount of after-tax dollars for elderly, retired persons. It
would be especially harsh to impose an increased tax burden on an-
nuity payments at a time when the annuitant is of advanced age and
likely has increased medical and related costs and burdens. This as-
pect of section 72 is designed as a benefit to the elderly, but it is an
especially rational one, and as we have seen, that benefit is not in-
creased by the asserted failure of the government to tax the annui-
tant on larger amounts of income in the earlier years of the annuity
payments.
B. Collection of Loans
Professor Chirelstein pointed to the treatment of mortgage in-
stallment payments to support his contention that all accrued interest
should be allocated to an annuity payment.89 Various commentators
have used the same analogy to loan repayments to support the thesis
that from an economic view a decelerated method of depreciation is
the only proper method. 90 The question of the proper allocation of
interest and principal to installment loan repayments is therefore rel-
evant to the examination of depreciation. Before discussing that
question, let us consider the tax law's provision for the allocation of
interest to loan repayments.
Under the tax law, an arm's length agreement between a debtor
and a creditor about how to allocate principal and income to install-
ment payments on an outstanding loan is determinative for tax pur-
poses. 91 Thus, if a creditor and a debtor who report their income on
88. I.R.C. § 72(b); Treas. Reg. 1.72-4(a)(4) (1956).
89. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45.
90. Id. 6.07, at 135. See also S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 389 n.138.
91. See Bayou Verret Land Co., 52 T.C. 971, 985-86 (1969), revd on other grounds, 450
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the cash method agree that all installment payments on a loan are to
be treated as repayments of principal until the debtor repays the en-
tire principal, the creditor does not recognize any income until the
payments to him exceed the amount of the loan.92 In such a case, the
creditor recovers all of his cost before payments to him constitute
income. If the parties do not expressly agree to an allocation of prin-
cipal and interest, all interest accrued at the date of an installment
payment is allocated to that payment.
93
A creditor and debtor typically allocate all accrued interest to
each installment loan repayment and treat the balance of the pay-
ment as principal. As indicated by the rulings and cases cited above,
that is not the exclusive method of allocation for cash method tax-
payers, but it is the one that is most commonly employed for home
mortgages. Yet the popularity of such an allocation does not make it
the best or the only proper method for accurately reporting the inter-
est income.
The great similarity between a loan repayable in fixed install-
ments and an annuity contract suggests that an accurate method of
reporting income from one should also be accurate for reporting in-
come from the other. As demonstrated above, the most accurate
method of reporting annuity income is one where the annuitant re-
covers a greater amount of the cost (ie., principal) in the early years
of the contract payments than in the later years, but other methods
may well be acceptable alternatives. In any event, allocating less to
interest in the early years provides a measure of net income that is at
least as accurate as any other. Accordingly, for persons on the cash
method, an acceptable method of allocating interest to an install-
ment payment on a debt is to allocate less interest in the early years
and more in the later years. If that is an acceptable method, and the
current tax law clearly permits it if the parties agree, why do the
F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 197 1); Huntington-Redondo Co., 36 B.T.A. 116 (1937), acq. in result 1937-2
C.B. 14; Rev. Rul. 72-2, 1972-1 C.B. 19, 20; Rev. Rul. 63-57, 1963-1 C.B. 103. A possible
exception to the general rule that the parties can allocate principal and interest as they see fit is
that the allocation of interest will not permit the debtor a deduction if (under I.R.C. § 446(b)) a
deduction would not clearly reflect income. See Mason v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 845, 848
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (dictum). It is unlikely that any allocation of accrued interest or of principal
would violate the clear reflection of income requirement unless there was a pre-payment of
interest which had not yet accrued. See, e.g., Burck v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 556 (1975), affd.,
533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1976).
92. See Huntington-Redondo Co., 36 B.T.A. 116 (1937), acq. in result 1937-2 C.B. 14; Rev.
Rul. 72-2, 1972-1 C.B. 19, 20, Rev. Rul. 63-57, 1963-1 C.B. 103. In Huntington-Redondo, the
agreement was made after the installment payment was received, but the court treated the
agreement as binding for tax purposes because the agreement was made prior to the end of the
taxable year in which the installment payment was received.
93. See Mason v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 845, 848 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Motel Corp. v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1433, 1440 (1970).
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parties to a home mortgage loan choose to allocate interest by such a
different method? I can offer only a few speculations on why the
allocation of interest first is so popular.
The majority of the large lenders are corporations who report
their income on the accrual method. Such lenders have to recognize
interest in the year of accrual, regardless of how the parties formally
allocated it. Such lenders would naturally tend to allocate payments
in an interest-first fashion, to give the borrower a tax benefit at no
tax detriment to themselves. Moreover, the commercial benefits to a
corporate lender of increasing its earnings per share could outweigh
the tax detriment of receiving interest payments first, even if such a
detriment existed. Many commercial loans are not repayable in
fixed installments of even amounts. Some debts are payable in one
lump sum, principal and interest, at maturity. Some debts require
that only interest be paid at fixed intervals until maturity, when the
debtor must repay the loan in full. In that situation, the creditor is
more like a shareholder of corporate stock than like an annuitant.
The creditor's investment remains intact while he collects income on
it until maturity; in essence he has income on a perpetual investment.
At maturity, the creditor can either prolong the loan or demand pay-
ment. Most corporate and government bonds are examples of such
"interest only" loans. In Section IV, I discuss whether a portion of
the current payments on such a nonwasting asset should be treated
as a return of capital, as a matter of tax policy.94 In that Section, I
also offer some ideas about why the present tax laws choose not to
characterize current payments in that manner and instead treat all
current payments on a nonwasting asset as interest. For present pur-
poses, it is enough to note that the Code taxes commercial loans in
that manner.
A similar commercial loan arrangement provides for the periodic
payment of interest plus an amount of principal substantially less
than the amount necessary to amortize the loan fully by the time of
maturity, when the debtor must make a large payment of principal
(sometimes referred to as a "balloon payment"). Again, for such
loans the accrued interest has been allocated first to periodic pay-
ments. In light of their familiarity with interest-only loans, commer-
cial lenders may well have identified an installment repayment loan
(such as a home mortgage) with them rather than with the more
closely analogous annuity contract; and so they allocate interest first
to each installment payment just as they do for an interest-only loan.
94. See text at note 119 infra.
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Another consideration is that the tax deductibility of interest pay-
ments makes the early allocation of larger amounts of interest highly
attractive to the debtor. Just as a lender adjusts interest rates accord-
ing to the going market, so might competition encourage him to allo-
cate interest first. Even if the lender is a cash method taxpayer so
that such an allocation disadvantages him, he may be forced by ac-
crual method competitors to offer the debtor favorable tax terms.
A third possible explanation is that a lender prefers to receive
interest first so that the principal of the debt is reduced as slowly as
possible. If the debtor defaults, the lender will have a more advanta-
geous position as a creditor of unpaid principal than he would as the
creditor of defaulted interest. One reason for this advantage is that
home mortgage loans bear simple interest, and. typically no interest
is payable on defaulted interest. By attributing an installment pay-
ment to earned interest, the lender maximizes the amount of interest
he will earn of the unpaid debt in the event of a subsequent default.
Indeed, because only simple interest is computed on the unpaid bal-
ance of the principal, the total amount of interest will be greater
(even without a default) if the principal balance is reduced at a
slower rate.
Finally, the practice of allocating interest income first is the sim-
plest method to apply and to explain to the borrower. A loan repay-
ment schedule where interest is allocated by discounting the
payment for its present value at the time that the loan was made
would boggle the mind of the average home owner.
Regardless of the reason for the common practice of allocating
all accrued interest to periodic installment payments on a home
mortgage loan, its generality does not prove that the allocation pro-
vides an accurate measure of net income, much less that it is the only
accurate measure. There are a variety of methods of allocation that
provide an acceptable measure of net income. The tax law impliedly
recognizes that no one method is exclusively correct by permitting
the parties to make whatever allocation they agree upon.95 Since the
parties are at arm's length, and since the debtor and the creditor
sometimes have conflicting tax interests in the method of allocation
employed, there is some reason for the government to leave to the
parties how to allocate interest.96 In contrast, the government does
95. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
96. The freedom granted to choose whatever cost recovery method the parties wish may be
too liberal in that it permits manipulation. The tax law perhaps should be amended to permit
only a single method of cost recovery allocation or at least to limit the number and extent of
elections available to the parties.
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not permit the parties to select the allocation method for annuities,
because there the government wants an annuitant's after-tax income
to remain roughly constant so that his standard of living does not
fluctuate dramatically.
IV. THE "CORRECT" METHOD OF DEPRECIATION TO MEASURE
NET INCOME
Until 1954, taxpayers seldom used accelerated depreciation even
though the tax laws permitted some types of accelerated deprecia-
tion. The principal accelerated method used before the adoption of
the 1954 Code was the 150% declining balance method.97 Double
declining balance and the sum of the years-digits methods are crea-
tures of the 1954 Code, which multiplied the permissible types of
accelerated depreciation. The avowed purposes of the liberalization
were to stimulate capital investment and to encourage risk-taking ex-
pansion.98 But while Congress was not seeking to improve measure-
ment of income, its allowance of accelerated depreciation should be
called a "tax expenditure" only if and to the extent that the deduc-
tion distorts the measurement of the taxpayer's net income. It has
been widely asserted and assumed that accelerated depreciation
causes such a distortion,99 especially when applied to buildings; in
this Section, I challenge that assumption.
The commentators who treat accelerated depreciation as a tax
preference urge that the proper measure of a year's depreciation al-
lowance is the decline in the property's value during that year. t00
The commentators do not suggest that a depreciable item should ac-
tually be valued at the end of each year; such a system would not be
practical to administer. Rather, they urge that the depreciation
schedule should generally reflect the manner in which properties de-
97. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 22 A48, revrintedin [1954] 3 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4017, 4047, 4184-85 (although 150% declining balance is available, most
taxpayers use straight-line depreciation). In appropriate circumstances, other accelerated
methods were permitted, however, even prior to 1954. For example, in Concord Cab Corp., 18
T.C. 1009 (1952), the court noted with approval that the Commissioner had allowed the tax-
payer corporation to depreciate the cost of taxicabs that it acquired, and which had a four-year
life, at an accelerated rate so that 45% of the cost was deductible in the first year, 25% the
second year, 20% the third year and 10% the fourth year. 18 T.C. at 1012.
98. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 25-26 (1954).
99. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45.
100. See, e.g., Eisner, Effects of Depreciation Allowances/or Tax Purposes, in 2 TAX REVI-
SION COMPENDIUM 793,797 (House Comm. on Ways and Means 1959), reprintedin READINGS
IN FEDERAL TAXATION 318, 322 (1970); Taubman & Rasche, Economic and Tax Depreciation
of ffice Buildings, 22 NATL. TAX J. 334 (1969); M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 6.07, at 133;
S. SuRREY, supra note 2, at 237; W. ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 452 (2d ed.
1979).
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dine in value over time. They point out that the actual decline in
value of many properties, especially of buildings, is far less than the
amount of depreciation allowable under the straight line method and
assert that accelerated methods aggravate the distortion that already
exists under the straight line method. One study concluded that the
"true depreciation" of office buildings in the first year of use is only
1/10 of the amount of depreciation allowable under the straight line
method and the "true depreciation" of apartment houses is 1/4 of
the straight line depreciation.' 0' To understand why property values
decline less in the first year than even the amount allowed under
straight line depreciation, and to understand why such a decline in
value is not representative of "true depreciation," a careful consider-
ation of so-called sinking fund depreciation will be helpful. Before
examining sinking-fund depreciation, however, let me summarize
the reasons that fluctuations in market prices do not, and should not,
affect the proper amount of depreciation that is allowable for tax
purposes.
Depreciation is an allocation of the cost an owner incurs in ac-
quiring an exhaustible asset. The amount of cost that is allocable to
the exhaustion of a portion of an asset's life should not be reduced or
increased merely because external market conditions have changed
the value of the remaining years of useful life: such unrealized ap-
preciation or depreciation is not taken into account for tax purposes
until realized. A brief example with simplified facts should be suffi-
cient to illustrate the irrelevance of changes in market prices.
Suppose in Year One, E wishes to acquire fire insurance for her
business property. The annual premium for fire insurance at that
time is $1000. E decides to purchase fire insurance for a five-year
period at a cost of $1000 per year, payable in one lump sum of $5000
in Year One. Of course, the portion of the premium payment re-
quired for Years Two to Five would be discounted to present value;
but in the interest of simplicity, we will ignore that detail and have E
pay the full amount of $5000.102 After one year, 1/5 of the fire insur-
ance contract has been exhausted and E paid $1000 for that year's
protection (1/5 of the $5000 premium). E now has a fire insurance
contract for four remaining years. Ignoring discounts for present
value, the contract for the four remaining years is worth $4000 if
market conditions have not altered. But what if by the end of the
101. Taubman & Rasche, Subsidies, Tax Law, and Real Estate Investment, ECONOMICS OF
FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS PART 3 - TAX SUBSIDIES, Joint Economic Committee, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 343-44 (1972), quotedin S. SURREY, supra note 2, at 237 n.113, 238 n.11.
102. The example is worked through using discounting in text following note 113 infra.
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year the annual premium charged for fire insurance has increased to
$1200 because of rising costs? 's fire insurance for the remaining
four-year period would then be worth $4800. The increase in market
value of the remaining 4/5 of the useful life of the insurance contract
does not alter the exhaustion of 1/5 of the insurance contract in the
prior year, insurance that cost E $1000. The cost should be allocated
according to the value that existed at the time that E purchased the
policy. If E had purchased five separate fire insurance contracts, one
for each successive year, she clearly would deduct $1000 for the ex-
haustion of the first contract, regardless of the increase in value of
the four remaining contracts at the end of that year. Similarly, a
decline in the cost of fire insurance, resulting in a loss in value of the
remaining 4/5 of the useful life of the five-year contract that E
purchased, should not increase the amount of depreciation allowable
to E for that first year.
The Supreme Court expressly noted the irrelevance of market
price fluctuations to depreciation allowance in Fribourg Navigation
Co. v. Commissioner.10 3 Midway in the taxable year in question, the
taxpayer had sold a ship for more than the ship's adjusted basis at
the beginning of the year. The ship's value had risen dramatically
because of the 1956 Suez crisis. The taxpayer claimed a depreciation
deduction for the portion of the year prior to the sale. The Supreme
Court allowed the deduction, holding (in effect) that the increase in
market value of the ship did not affect the allocation of cost to the
exhaustion of a portion of the useful life of that asset.
Yet the observation that the actual decline in property values
during the first year of use is less than the straight line depreciation
allowance does not depend upon changes in market conditions. The
"sinking-fund depreciation" concept is a sophisticated analysis that
demonstrates that even though market conditions remain constant,
an asset that produces constant annual income will decline less in
value in the early years of its use than in the later years. Tax special-
ists have widely accepted sinking-fund depreciation as providing the
most accurate, or perhaps the only correct, measurement of true de-
preciation. Professor Chirelstein provides one of the clearest expla-
nations of sinking-fund depreciation in his excellent book on income
taxation,' °4 and I borrow the following example from that book to
illustrate the concept.
The analysis begins with an assumption that the market value of
103. 383 U.S. 272, 276 (1966).
104. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 6.07, at 133-35.
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an asset is the present value of the income stream that the asset will
produce. In effect, the estimated income from each year of the as-
set's useful life is discounted to present value, and the sum of those
present values equals the market value of the asset. Now suppose
that on January 1 of Year One, K purchases a machine for $4000. K
plans to use the machine in his business, and he estimates that the
machine will produce $1200 of revenue each year for five years, the
useful life of the machine. To simplify the problem, let us assume
that K anticipates no repairs or maintenance expenses and that K
acquires the $1200 of annual revenue in one lump sum at the end of
each year. Then the expected rate of return from the machine is
slightly more than 15%. This is computed by determining the dis-
count rate that will produce a $4000 present value for an income
stream of $1200 per year for five years. If the $1200 revenue for each
year is discounted at a little more than a 15% compounded rate, the
present value is the $4000 that K paid for the machine. We will
assume that others also could earn $1200 annually from the use of
the machine, and so 15% is the market discount rate for the machine.
The theory of sinking-fund depreciation is that the true deprecia-
tion of the machine for a given year is the difference between the
present value of the remaining income stream, determined at the be-
ginning of the year, and the present value of the remaining income
stream, determined at the end of that year. The following schedule,




Present Value Present Value Present
of Investment of Remaining Payments Value
1 2 3 4 5
Start of Year I $4,000 $1,045 905 790 687 573
End of Year I 3,427 1,045 905 790 687 $573
End of Year 2 2,427 1,045 905 790 687
End of Year 3 1,950 1,045 905 790
End of Year 4 1,045 1,045 905
End of Year 5 -0- 1,045
Total: $4,000
In connection with the above schedule, Professor Chirelstein
states:
The last column shows the true measure of economic cost from year to
year and indicates that the correct apportionment method is one which
starts low and rises: $573 in Year 1, then $687, $790, $905, and finally
$1,045 in Year 5. The resulting schedule of taxable income, of course
is the inverse: $627 of taxable income in Year 1, $513 in Year 2, $410
in Year 3, $295 in Year 4 and finally $155 in year 5. Income is thus
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higher in the earlier years than in the later.'
0 5
The conclusion that Professor Chirelstein derives from this anal-
ysis is that a decelerated method of depreciation is the only accurate
measurement of net income. The market value of an item of prop-
erty declines less in its early years of use, and so a smaller amount of
cost recovery (i e., depreciation) should be allocated to those early
years. The correct amount of depreciation for any given year is said
to be equal to the value at the beginning of that year of the revenue
the owner will receive in the last year for which he expects to use the
asset.
The advocates of decelerated depreciation, including Professor
Chirelstein, typically do not urge the abolition of straight line depre-
ciation as a permissible method. They recognize that the anticipated
income stream of an asset is more difficult to determine than that of
an annuity or a self-liquidating loan; an asset used in a business
often does not produce a level amount of revenue each year. But,
Professor Chirelstein concludes, "In principle, nevertheless, sinking-
fund is the only proper method of apportioning the taxpayer's capital
investment in accordance with the economic cost of use."'
10 6
Most surprisingly, public response to the sinking-fund concept
was uncritically accepting. The "model" depreciation schedule is
counter-intuitive and should have inspired some skeptical examina-
tion of the sinking-fund premises. Referring back to the example
above, if one were to ask K for which year's income he paid the
most, the answer would be the income from Year 1. In valuing the
machine at $4000, K valued the first year's income at $1045 (as
shown on the schedule) and he valued the fifth year's income at only
$573. Yet, under the sinking-fund concept, K finds that, almost
magically, his true "cost" of receiving the income for Year 1 was the
$573 he paid for the fifth year's income, and his true cost of receiving
the income earned in Year 5 was the $1045 he paid for the first year's
income.
The fallacy in the sinking-fund concept is that it is premised on
an assumption that the exhaustion of one year's useful life of an asset
should be offset by the unrealized appreciation in the remaining
years of life that arises by virtue of the passage of time. Referring
back to the example above, the last four years of the life of the
machine had a greater value after the expiration of one year's time
because the revenue for those years was discounted one fewer year.
105. Id. at 134-35 (emphasis in original).
106. Id at 135 (emphasis in original).
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But should that increase in present value affect the determination of
the amount of cost to be allocated to the exhaustion of the first year
of the machine's useful life? Surely not. The cost of the first year's
use is completely unrelated to any unrealized appreciation in the
value of the right to use the machine in later years.
It should be emphasized that for tax purposes depreciation is a
means of allocating a cost that the taxpayer incurred in a prior year.
The normal means of allocating cost to an item of property is to
determine what amount the owner paid for that item. For exam-
ple, suppose J purchases a single unimproved lot for $100,000 at a
time when the front half of the lot has a value of $75,000 and the
back half has a value of $25,000. Eight years later, each half is worth
$95,000 as a result of some improvements by the city, and J decides
to subdivide the lot and sell the back half for $95,000. How does J
determine his basis in the rear parcel? He allocates his original
$100,000 cost between the front and rear portions of the lot, accord-
ing to the respective values of those portions at the time that he
purchased the property. 0 7 Thus, J had a basis of $25,000 in the rear
parcel and recognizes a gain of $70,000 on the sale.
Similarly, the cost of a depreciable item should be allocated to
each year of the asset's use according to the amount paid for that
year's use: the amount of income that the taxpayer initially expected
the property to produce in that year, discounted to present value as
of the date that the taxpayer acquired the property. In Professor
Chirelstein's example, the cost to be allocated to the first year of use
of the machine is the $1045 that K paid for the income stream for
that year. Under this analysis, an accelerated depreciation schedule
is an accurate allocation of cost, and the straight line method is dis-
tortive in that it unduly defers the taxpayer's recovery of his cost.
The thrust of my thesis is that just as realty can be -subdivided
geographically by metes and bounds, and just as we allocate the tax-
payer's basis to each subdivided parcel according to the amount that
the taxpayer paid for that parcel, so can realty (and all other proper-
ties) be subdivided temporally, and so should we allocate a tax-
payer's basis to each subdivided year according to the amount that
the taxpayer paid for the right to the property for that year. When a
year of an asset's life is used up, depreciation should be allowed in
the amount of the taxpayer's basis that is allocated to that year. 0 8
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (1957). See Fairfield Plaza, Inc., 39 T.C. 706 (1963), acq. in
result 1963-2 C.B. 4; Wellesley A. Ayling, 32 T.C. 704, 710 (1959), acq. in result 1959-2 C.B. 3.
108. One interesting aspect of the above analysis is the consequence of applying it to the
sale of a personal residence or other personally used property. If the above thesis is carried to
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Interestingly, Professor Chirelstein's general discussion of cost re-
covery includes analysis supporting the thesis that, from an eco-
nomic viewpoint, accelerated depreciation provides a measurement
of net income that is at least as accurate as other methods. In dis-
cussing the manner in which the taxpayer should recover the cost of
purchasing corporate stock (a nonwasting asset), Professor Chirel-
stein raises three different possibilities for consideration:
(1) We could treat each dividend as a return of capital until the
shareholder's cost is recovered and treat all dividends thereafter
as income.
(2) We could treat each dividend as income and allow the share-
holder to recover his capital only when the shares are sold.
(3) We could treat each dividend partly as income and partly as a
return of the shareholder's capital. We could allocate to capital
recovery an amount equal to the present value when the share-
holder bought the stock of the dividend that the shareholder esti-
mated he would receive during the year in question; we could
treat the balance of the actual dividend as income.10 9
Professor Chirelstein acknowledges that "there is something to be
said for each of [the three alternative suggestions], and not very
much more to be said for one than for the others.""I10 The principal
fault that Professor Chirelstein finds with the third alternative is not
conceptual but rather rests on the administrative unfeasibility of
its logical conclusion, the taxpayer's basis in his residence should equal only the amount of
basis that he has in the remaining useful life of that asset. In the years before he sold the
residence, he used up his basis in his right to use the residence during those prior years. There
are many practical reasons, including administrative convenience, for exempting personally
held property from basis adjustment. The prospect of determining the useful life, salvage
value, and depreciation method for each personally used item is mind boggling. The tax law
properly makes no provision for basis adjustments in such cases, but the principle is worth
noting. Cf. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 15.02, at 253 (basis adjustment for personal
residences would be logical but for several reasons Code does not provide for them).
Another question that flows from the above analysis is whether depreciation deductions
should be permitted for income-producing assets that have no ascertainable useful life. For
example, the purchase of a share of stock is equivalent to the purchase of the income stream
from that share. The value of the stock is equal to the sum of the present values of the antici-
pated annual income from the stock, and the present value of the income after a substantial
length of time (such as 30 years) is so small as to be disregarded. Should the taxpayer deduct
the cost of each year's dividend income as depreciation for that year? As Professor Chirelstein
points out, a solid case can be made for an allocation of cost. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note
45, 2.01, at 25-27. See also Joyce & Del Cotto, The AB (4BC) and BA Transactions., An
Economic and Tax Analysis ofReserved and Carved Out Income Interests, 31 TAx. L. REv. 121,
123-30 (1976). Presumably, the most important reasons that the current tax law allows no
depreciation are: 1) administrative convenience (the determination of an investor's expected
return is highly conjectural, although conventional methods of depreciation could be em-
ployedjust as they are with other assets); 2) adherence to established accounting practice; and,
3) application of the salvage value principle to a nonwasting asset. This issue is discussed in
greater detail in text at notes 116-20 infra.
109. M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 2.01(a), at 25-26.
110. Id. at 26.
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finding an investor's anticipated dividend return."I But the third
alternative is the same accelerated form of cost recovery that I rec-
ommend for depreciation of a wasting asset. In light of that analysis,
it is surprising that Professor Chirelstein describes the decelerated
sinking-fund method as the only proper method in principle." 
2
Let us return to the example of K and the machine with the five-
year useful life to consider the merits and faults of the sinking-fund
notion that the exhaustion of an asset should be offset by the unreal-
ized appreciation in its remaining useful life. Suppose K elects to
rent a machine for one year. Since he desires a 15% return on his
investment, he pays $1045 to rent the machine, and he properly de-
ducts that expense. But, according to the sinking-fund concept, if
instead K purchases the machine, the cost of that first year's income
is reduced to $573 because K will enjoy an unrealized appreciation
of $472 on the remaining four years' life of the machine. To test that
consequence, let us alter the facts slightly.
Suppose K seeks to purchase the machine for $4000, but the sell-
er G is not willing to part with the machine right away. The seller
offers to sell K the machine, subject to G's right to retain and use it
for one year; thus, ( offers to sell K a future interest in the machine,
to commence in possession one year later. K agrees. Looking at the
schedule above, K determines the value of income streams for years
Two to Five by discounting the revenue for each year to its present
value at the beginning of Year One. The sum of those present values
is $2955, and K pays G that amount. But K still needs a machine for
Year One, so he rents a similar machine from H for one year at a
rental of $1045. At the end of Year One, K has spent $1045 to rent a
machine and acquires possession of a like machine, the value of
which has risen from the $2955 that he paid for it to $3427 (the
increase in value is caused by the fact that the income stream will
be discounted one less year). The unrealized appreciation of the
machine that K bought will not affect the amount of his deduction
for the rental of the first machine. Nor will K be taxed on that ap-
preciation. Yet, from k's standpoint, there is little difference be-
tween this latter situation and the outright purchase of the machine
for $4000. In both cases, K pays $4000 for the use of the machine for
five years. Clearly, given a realization doctrine, a decelerated rate of
depreciation does not square with our tax structure."
3
111. Id. at 27.
112. Id. at 135.
113. See Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note 108. One might question whether Kwould be able
to rent the machine at a rental of $1045. Since we assumed that a vendor would be willing to
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To take a final illustration, let us reconsider the example of the
purchase of fire insurance, but this time discount the premiums to
present value. Suppose E wishes to purchase fire insurance for a
five-year period, and the current amount of a year's premium is
$1000. Because E is paying all of the premiums for the policy at the
beginning of the first year, the premiums for subsequent years must
be discounted. The parties agree upon a 10% compounded rate of
discount.
The premiums are determined as follows:
Undiscounted Discounted
premium premium
Year One $1,000 $1,000
Year Two 1,000 909
Year Three 1,000 826
Year Four 1,000 751
Year Five 1,000 683
Total $5,000 $4,169
Thus, E paid $4169 at the beginning of Year One for fire risk
protection for five years. After one year, what amount of L's cost of
$4169 should be allocated to that first year as a depreciation deduc-
tion? While E paid $1000 for that first year's coverage (as indicated
in the table above), the value of the remaining four years of coverage
has increased because of the reduction by one year of the period of
discount. That is, if B were to sell her building and the fire insur-
ance thereon, the value of the remaining four years coverage of fire







The value of the fire insurance at the beginning of the year was
sell the machine for $4000, which represents a price of $1045 for the first year's income stream,
it does not appear unreasonable to assume that a person in the business of leasing such ma-
chines would rent it for one year for the same price ($1045). In any event, if the lessor required
K to pay a larger rental for the machine, that would not alter the significance of the hypotheti-
cal example. K would deduct whatever amount of rent he paid in Year One without regard to
the fact that the value of the future interest he had purchased in the other machine had in-
creased.
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$4169 and the value at the end of the year was $3486; so, under the
sinking-fund method, only $683 of depreciation would be allowable
for that year.
If instead; E were to purchase five separate fire insurance policies
from five different companies, paying $1000 for the policy covering
Year One, $909 for Year Two, $826 for Year Three, $751 for Year
Four, and $683 for Year Five, current tax law would clearly permit
her a deduction of $1000 after one year. The unrealized apprecia-
tion of her four other policies would not affect that deduction. There
is no reason to believe that the true economics of the transaction are
different where E buys one five-year policy instead of five separate
policies. In Section III, we developed a strong case for allocating
more cost to the early years of an annuitant's periodic receipts than
to the later years; the same analysis is persuasive for depreciation.
In sum, the proper method for allocating the cost or basis of a
depreciable asset is to allocate to each year the present value of that
year's anticipated income, determined at the date that the taxpayer
acquired the asset. Under this method, the amount that the taxpayer
actually paid for a year's income is the amount of cost that is allo-
cated to that year. This analysis has assumed that the owner will
derive a constant annual amount of income from the use of an asset
and has not taken costs for repairs and maintenance into account. In
fact, the anticipated annual income from an asset will rarely be a
constant figure, but without evidence of the expected income pattern
from a particular type of asset, assuming constant income is proba-
bly the best one can do. For buildings, however, empirical data sug-
gest that the income from older buildings is less than the income
from newer buildings." 4 A smaller anticipated income stream dur-
ing the later years of a building than during its earlier years means
that a purchaser will pay less for the later years of the income
stream. This in turn magnifies the amount of acceleration that is
appropriate for proper income measurement.
On the other hand, the purchaser of a new building may well
anticipate a smaller income stream for the first one or two years,
expecting a higher vacancy rate in those early years. Not all new
buildings suffer high vacancy rates, however, and on balance, the
current rates of acceleration do not appear to be excessive. More-
over, if the owner incurs greater repairs and maintenance costs in the
later years of an asset's use,1t5 they will also reduce the amount of
114. See Taubman & Rasche, supra note 100, at 335, 337.
115. But see id. at 336-37 (authors found that repair and maintenance costs for buildings
remained fairly constant).
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the purchase price that is allocable to those years - the purchaser
will pay less for the anticipated gross income from a year where the
costs of producing that gross income are larger.
The necessary conclusion is that an accelerated rate of deprecia-
tion provides a more accurate measurement of net income than does
a straight line method. The method's greater accuracy does not,
however, mean that only accelerated depreciation is proper. Below, I
shall discuss several areas in which the tax laws sacrifice accuracy
and the realization doctrine to other valid tax policies. Nevertheless
this analysis does show that where it reflects the greater cost of the
early years of income stream, acceleration of cost recovery is not a
"preference." And contrary to the assertion of the champions of the
decelerated methods, straight line depreciation surely does not con-
stitute a preference.
The current tax laws include exceptions to the principle of reali-
zation that superficially appear to provide modest support for a more
general application of the sinking-fund concept. The current tax
treatment of salvage value is a good example. As noted above," 16 the
amount to be depreciated equals the difference between the tax-
payer's basis in an asset and the asset's salvage value. Salvage value
is an estimate made at the time the asset is put into service of the
price at which the asset will sell when its useful life is exhausted."
17
The price at the end of the asset's useful life is equal to the present
value at that later time of the estimated income stream to be derived
from the property after the useful life has expired. That calculation,
by shifting the perspective from the date the asset is put into service
to the date the asset exhausts its useful life, is consistent with the
sinking-fund theory. From an economic view, however, no such
shift in perspective is appropriate, and therefore salvage value
should be reduced to present value as of the date the asset is put into
service." 18 While the current tax practice is inaccurate, it quite rea-
116. See text following note 59 supra.
117. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-I(c) (1956).
118. In this connection, note that in their basic text on economics, Professors Alchian and
Allen state that in determining the cost of operating an asset for a stated period of time, the
value of the asset at the end of that period, discounted topresent Yalue as of the beginning date of
theperiod, is subtracted from the value of the asset at the beginning of the period. See M.
ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, supra note 54, at 247-48. The authors stress that the two figures "must
be compared in contemporaneous values" in order to determine the cost accurately.
A contrary view was expressed by Professor Eisner, who maintained that in determining
depreciation, the loss in value of an asset should be offset by any "increases in the value of the
property." Eisner, supra note 100. Indeed, Professor Eisner was sufficiently convinced that
depreciation allowances are excessive to recommend to Congress that serious consideration be
given to eliminating the allowance for depreciation deductions entirely. Id. Eisner would have
been justified in believing that he was the first person to propose such radical action, but
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sonably promotes simplicity and ease of administration. It is diffi-
cult enough to require a taxpayer to speculate about the price at
which an asset will sell some years in the future without demanding
that he then reduce the estimated price to present value. An estimate
of selling price is not likely to be sufficiently reliable to justify the
fine tuning of reducing it to present value.
My analysis of the proper way to allocate cost recovery would
also seem at odds with the present tax treatment of revenue received
on an investment in perpetuity. Under current tax practice, if P pays
$100 for an annuity of $10 per year forever, each $10 payment will
be treated as income to P, as would a dividend on a share of stock.
But why shouldn't P be treated as having purchased an income
stream of $10 per year and the discounted cost of his right to each
year's payment be allocated to the actual payment for such a year?" 9
At a 6% discount rate, P paid $9.43 for the right to the first year's $10
payment, $8.90 for the right to the second year's payment, etc. The
cost of the right to payments many years in the future would be so
small as to be disregarded, but under this allocation only 57¢, of the
first year's $10 payment would be income. This treatment clearly
follows from my earlier analysis of allocation of cost recovery, yet
the tax laws presently treat every bit of each $10 payment as income
to P. Why?
One possible explanation for that treatment would be a congres-
sional endorsement of the so-called sinking-fund depreciation con-
cept. Under this theory, Congress might have decided that the cost
recovery component of each $10 payment should be offset by an ex-
actly equal amount of appreciation in the value of the right to the
remaining income stream, since the realization of the future pay-
ments is one year closer. Yet the sinking-fund rationale has never
been articulated as the reason for allowing no cost recovery, and
while it seems impossible to prove the true reason for the present
treatment, I believe quite different considerations motivated it.
I have remarked that under the present tax laws, salvage value is
the estimated price for which the owner can sell an asset at the expi-
ration of its useful life, and this estimated price is not discounted to
present value at the time of purchase. That treatment of salvage
value is a compromise with the principle of realization, but it is a
surprisingly the eradication of depreciation deductions was proposed on at least one prior
occasion. In 1935, Representative Marcantonio unsuccessfully sought to have included in a
revenue bill a provision to eliminate the depreciation deduction. 79 CONG. REC. 12,426 (1935).
119. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 2.01, at 25-27; Joyce & Del Cotto, supra note
108, at 121, 123-30.
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compromise I think well founded in considerations of simplicity and
economy. The treatment of all payments on investments in
perpetuity as pure interest can be understood as a simple application
of the salvage value limitation. As long as the tax laws do not dis-
count salvage to present value, a nonwasting asset's salvage value
will equal its purchase price, aind no cost recovery should be allowed.
Given the present salvage value rules, the current treatment of the
return from nonwasting assets is necessary for consistent treatment
of wasting and nonwasting investments.
For depreciation of wasting assets, Congress has imposed the sal-
vage value limitation, but it has also authorized the amortization of
the depreciable balance by accelerated forms of depreciation. As we
have seen, those accelerated forms are more consistent with the gen-
eral doctrine of realization than is the tax treatment of salvage value
and nonwasting assets. I see no benefit in labeling a congressional
value judgment a "tax expenditure" when it is consonant with essen-
tial principles of our tax system.
A number of consequences flow from the conclusion that acceler-
ated depreciation is more accurate (or at least no less accurate) than
other methods. First, any proposal to eliminate accelerated depreci-
ation should offer significant justifications and should not rest on a
general belief that acceleration is inaccurate. Second, the current
limitations on the availability of accelerated depreciation for realty
should be reexamined. Third, accelerated depreciation on buildings
should be eliminated from the Tax Expenditure Budgets: whether or
not methods such as 200% declining balance offer more depreciation
than I have justified here, the present Budgets clearly exaggerate the
true amount. And once it is known that some acceleration of depre-
ciation is proper, it becomes extremely difficult to measure the antici-
pated income stream from buildings with sufficient accuracy to
determine precisely the appropriate amount of acceleration. It
would be misleading to pluck a dollar figure from conjecture and
record it as the preference involved. Fourth, Congress should proba-
bly repeal the inclusion of the accelerated portion of depreciation on
buildings and on certain other properties as a tax preference item
under sections 57(a)(2) and (3) that, inter alia, 20 may be subject to
the surtax known as the "add-on minimum tax." Fifth, Congress
should repeal the provision in section 312(k) preventing corporations
from reducing their earnings and profits by the accelerated portion
of depreciation. Sixth, the conceptual justifications for the recapture
120. For example, inclusion in §§ 57(a)(2)-(3) may affect the amount of income that quali-
fies for the 50% maximum tax on personal service income. I.R.C. § 1348.
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of depreciation provisions become suspect. In the next Section, I ex-
amine those rules in detail.
V. RECAPTURE OF DEPRECIATION
A. Background
As part of the Revenue Act of 1962, Congress adopted section
1245 - the recapture of depreciation provision.' 2' In essence, this
provision requires that the taxpayer recognize the gain realized on
disposing of most depreciable personalty (and of certain depreciable
realty other than a building or its structural components) as ordinary
income to the extent that the gain arises as a consequence of depreci-
ation previously allowed to the taxpayer. The provision effectively
treats as ordinary income any of the taxpayer's gain that he would
not have realized but for the previous allowance of a depreciation
deduction. Section 1245 applies to all dispositions of covered prop-
erty unless the transaction is exempt under the terms of section 1245
itself; it overrides other Code sections and can cause recognition of
income even though another provision expressly grants nonrecogni-
tion. For convenience, I will ignore the limited types of realty that
section 1245 covers, and I will treat the section as applying only to
personalty, both tangible and intangible. All depreciation and amor-
tization deductions taken on personalty are subject to recapture, re-
gardless of the method of depreciation employed. Thus, even
straight line depreciation is subject to recapture.
Before the adoption of the 1962 Act, a gain or loss recognized on
the sale or exchange of depreciable property that had been used in a
trade or business for a significant period of time was characterized as
gain or loss under section 1231. Congress first adopted section 1231
in 1942 as a response to problems that arose after the outbreak of the
Second World War. 22 Although it is an oversimplification, for our
purposes it is sufficient to state that gains recognized on a sale or
exchange under section 1231 are generally treated as long-term capi-
tal gains, and losses recognized on a sale or exchange under section
1231 are treated as ordinary losses. A few tax specialists believe that
Congress erred in providing capital gains treatment for such proper-
ties under section 1231, preferring that any gain arising from the
conduct of a business be treated as ordinary income.123 Presumably
121. See Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 13(a)(1), 76 Stat. 960.
122. See W. ANDREWS, supra note 100, at 482; B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 578-79 (4th ed. 1972).
123. See 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. MCDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXA-
TION 1018 (1972 ed.).
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because it was unable to convince Congress to repeal section 1231,
the Treasury Department proposed a recapture of depreciation pro-
vision that carves out from section 1231 much of the gain from de-
preciable personalty that otherwise would have been treated as a
long-term capital gain. The recapture of depreciation provisions can
be viewed as effectively repealing part of section 1231.
Whether Congress should repeal section 1231 is a question that
will not be examined in this Article. I believe that Congress should
retain section 1231,124 but I leave that issue for another article. I will
limit myself here to a consideration of the validity of the justifica-
tions Congress accepted in adopting the recapture provisions.
In his statement at the Senate Finance Committee's Hearings on
the Revenue Act of 1962, the Secretary of the Treasury, Douglas Dil-
lon, stated:
The President recommended that capital gain treatment be withdrawn
from gains on the disposition of depreciable property, both real and
personal, to the extent of prior depreciation allowances.
Such gain reflects depreciation allowances in excess of the actual
decline in value of the asset and under the President's proposal would
be treated as ordinary income. Any gain in excess of the cost of the
asset would still be treated as capital gain. This reform would elimi-
nate an unfair tax advantage which the law today gives to those who
depreciate property at a rate in excess of the actual decline in market
value and then proceed to sell the property, thus, in effect, converting
ordinary income into a capital gain. It is particularly essential at this
time in view of the impending administrative revision of depreciation
guidelines. 12
5
To paraphrase the Treasury Department argument, a taxpayer
deducts depreciation from ordinary income; when he sells the depre-
ciated asset, any "excessive" depreciation that he recaptures may get
long-term capital treatment under section 1231. In that manner, the
taxpayer can convert what would be ordinary income into a long-
term capital gain. At least regarding personal property, Congress
was convinced by that argument 26 and adopted section 1245.
Congress was making other Code revisions when it adopted sec-
tion 1245, and the pressures that surrounded those other changes
shed light on the origins of the recapture provision. One set of
changes was designed to allow more flexibility in estimating depreci-
ation. As Professor Samuelson notes in his basic text on economics,
124. See M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 45, 110.02, at 309-10.
125. Revenue Act of 1962: Hearings on HR. 10650 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1962).
126. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 66-68 (1962), reprinted in 1962-1963 C.B.
405, 470-72.
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"Although depreciation is usually figured by some apparently exact
formula, every accountant knows that the estimates are really very
rough, being subject to large and unpredictable errors and involving
arbitrary corrections and assumptions."127 Given that imprecision, it
is understandable that the depreciation provisions before 1962 had
been the source of many heated disputes between taxpayers and the
Service. To minimize such disputes and the bad will they generate,
Congress adopted a number of liberalizing provisions, including sec-
tion 167(f), which authorized a taxpayer to reduce the salvage value
of certain personal property items by up to 10% of the asset's basis.
Congress felt more comfortable liberalizing the depreciation allow-
ance in that manner when it knew it could recapture "excessive" de-
preciation with section 1245.128
The 1962 legislation did not extend the recapture of depreciation
rules to buildings or to most other depreciable realty. The refusal to
do so was later explained as resting on the fear that much of the gain
in realty is a product of appreciation through external market condi-
tions rather than a consequence of excessive depreciation claims by
the taxpayer.' 29 In 1964, however, Congress reduced the discrepancy
between its treatments of realty and personalty by adopting the first
version of section 1250. Section 1250 does not recapture deprecia-
tion with quite the same vigor as section 1245. Under section 1250, if
the taxpayer has held the realty for more than one year, only the so-
called "additional depreciation" is subject to recapture. The "addi-
tional depreciation" is the difference between the aggregate depreci-
ation allowed to the taxpayer before the time of disposition and the
aggregate depreciation that would have been allowable to the tax-
payer over the same period under the straight line method of depre-
ciation. 30 The committee reports to the 1964 Act explain the
reasons that Congress imposed restrictions on the recapture for re-
alty:
Your committee generally has limited the depreciation recapture to the
excess over straight line depreciation because it believes that only to
this extent could the depreciation taken appropriately be considered in
excess of the decline in the value of the property which occurs over
time. If a gain still occurs, it is believed that this is attributable to a rise
in price levels generally rather than to an absence of a decline in the
value of the property. The portion representing the rise in value is
127. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 124 (10th ed. 1976).
128. H.R. REP. No. 1447, supra note 126, at 66-68.
129. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 101-02 (1963).
130. I.R.C. § 1250(b).
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comparable to other forms of gains which quite generally are treated as
capital gains. Moreover, your committee believes that when the prop-
erty is held for an extended period of time, gains realized on the sale or
other disposition of the property are more likely to be attributable to
price rises generally than to an excess of depreciation deductions. For
that reason, your committee's bill also tapers off over a 10-year period
the proportion of the additional depreciation (or gain where smaller)
which is to be treated as ordinary income upon the sale of the prop-
erty.1 3
1
As originally adopted, section 1250 phased out recapture by 1%
for each month that the property was held in excess of 20 months.
Thus, if the taxpayer held the realty for at least 10 years, no depreci-
ation would be recaptured. Subsequent legislation eliminated this
phase-out provision; currently the Code reduces the amount of addi-
tional depreciation to be recaptured only for owners of certain low
income housing projects.
In sum, the entire amount of depreciation allowed on personal
property is currently subject to recapture. For buildings held more
than one year, only the additional amount of depreciation above
straight line depreciation is subject to recapture.
B. Is Recapture Just'fable?
Congress rested its adoption of the recapture rules on two linked
assumptions: (1) that true depreciation for a year is the amount of
decline in the asset's value during the year, and therefore (2) that a
taxpayer who disposed of a depreciable asset when its value exceeds
its basis probably claimed excessive depreciation during the preced-
ing years.132 Yet those initial assumptions are misguided. As we saw
in Section IV, selling an asset for profit does not indicate that an
excessive amount of depreciation was allowed. Quite apart from any
change in market prices, the selling price of an item will be greater
than its original cost less a "true" amount of depreciation, because of
the appreciation that will have occurred in the discounted value of
the property's remaining income stream. More fundamentally, Con-
gress erroneously assumed that "accurate" depreciation is equal to
the decline in value of an asset over a period of time. But as I
demonstrated in Section IV, the accurate depreciation for an asset
131. S. REP. No. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 133 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. 102-03 (1963).
132. Congress did not believe that a gradual increase in market value of the remaining life
of a depreciable asset should cause recapture, since such an increase does not indicate that an
excessive amount of depreciation had been claimed. Because Congress determined that mar-
ket value is more likely to rise for realty, it provided a more limited form of recapture for
buildings. See note 131 supra and accompanying text.
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for a given year is the cost to the taxpayer of that year's use; the
taxpayer's basis should be allocated among the temporal divisions of
the asset's useful life, and the amount of basis allocated to a given
year is the amount that should be allowed as depreciation for that
year.
To illustrate, let us reconsider the example of K and the machine
with a five-year useful life. K expected the machine to produce in-
come of $1200 per year for the five-year period. Discounting at a
little more than a 15% rate, the present values of the income stream







The value of the machine at the time that K purchased it was $4000
(the sum of the present values of the income stream), and K paid
that amount. K elected to depreciate the machine on the straight
line method. Accordingly, K claimed and was allowed a deprecia-
tion deduction of $800 for Year One and an additional depreciation
deduction for Year Two. At the beginning of Year Three, K sold the
machine. The income stream of the machine continued to be $1200
per year, so the value of the machine at the beginning of Year Three
was $2740 - the sum of the present values of the income stream for
a three-year period ($1045 plus $905 plus $790) and K sold it for that
amount. X's basis in the machine at that time was equal to the dif-
ference between his cost of $4000 and the $1600 of depreciation that
he took in Years One and Two: $2400. When he sold the machine
for $2740, K recognized a gain of $340 on the sale, all of which is
characterized as ordinary income by section 1245.
Was K not allowed an excessive amount of depreciation? The
$1600 of depreciation allowed to him is $350 less than the $1950 he
actually paid for those two years' use ($1045 for Year One plus $905
for Year Two). The $340 gain that K recognized is clearly attributa-
ble to the increase in value of the remaining three years of useful life
of the machine, an increase caused by the reduction of the time
before the right to those future years of use becomes a present pos-
sessory right to produce income. The ordinary income imposed by
section 1245 on K is erroneously labeled as a recapture of K's depre-
ciation. Instead, it is an exception to section 1231 treatment that is
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imposed on the appreciation of the remaining useful life of a depre-
ciable asset.
If, because of inflation or other market factors, the income stream
from the machine increased above $1200 per year, then the value of
the machine in Year Three would have been greater and section
1245 would have forced K to recognize more ordinary income. Such
market price fluctuation is the essence of a capital gain and should
not be converted to ordinary income merely because the owner of
the asset had previously used the asset and deducted the associated
basis. Whether capital gains treatment should be granted at all is a
separate question. My theses here are only that the ordinary income
treatment imposed by section 1245 is inconsistent with our current
capital gains system, and that the misleading slogan "recapture of
depreciation" may have induced Congress to adopt an exception to
capital gains treatment without appreciating how little "recapture"
of excessive depreciation was really involved.
I do not contend that straight line depreciation will never cause
an excessive allowance: if the asset's useful life or salvage value is
understated, the taxpayer will deduct more than a fair allocation of
basis, and such understatement can occur for a variety of reasons.
The estimates made of useful life and salvage value are very inexact
guesses, 133 and statutory provisions permit the use of shorter useful
lives for some assets (the ADR election) and a reduction of salvage
value for certain tangible personalty.134
Yet I do contend that the recapture provisions of section 1245 are
an unnecessarily drastic response to the possibility of excessive de-
preciation. As we have seen, the gain recognized on a sale bears no
logical relation to the amount of excessive depreciation. Some gain
is appropriate because of the increase in value of the remaining life
of an asset that accompanies the passage of time. In our current
economy, much of the gain will be attributable to inflation if the
owner has held the asset for more than a few years. To tax inflation-
ary gain at all is very close to a tax on capital, and to tax it at ordi-
nary income rates is especially harsh. Perhaps one of the principal
justifications for capital gain treatment is to reduce the tax rate on
inflationary gains, and the recapture rules contravene that policy. By
relying on the gain recognized at a sale, the recapture provisions are
far more likely to be taxing appreciation over time, inflation, and
other market gains than to be recapturing excessive depreciation.
133. See text at note 127 supra.
134. I.R.C. § 167(0.
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Even the excessive depreciation allowed by ADR or salvage
value reduction will not be too significant for a taxpayer using the
straight line method, since, as we have seen, some acceleration is
appropriate. Admittedly, a taxpayer can combine those two elec-
tions with an accelerated depreciation method to magnify the
amount of acceleration excessively. Nonetheless, cause for concern
lies only where the taxpayer uses an accelerated depreciation
method, and no straight line depreciation should be recaptured.
Congress should either repeal or amend the recapture provisions
of section 1245 to recapture no more than the "additional deprecia-
tion" described in section 1250 - the excess of the aggregate depre-
ciation allowed over the aggregate amount allowable under the
straight line method. In some cases, such a recapture rule will im-
pose ordinary income on market price gains and in some cases the
rule will not recapture all of an excessive depreciation allowance, but
it is a feasible rule to administer and provides a less inaccurate mea-
surement than the current version of section 1245. Moreover, for the
reasons I discuss below regarding section 1250, even the additional
depreciation amount subject to recapture should be reduced with the
passage of time.
Congress should also modify or repeal section 1250. If an "accu-
rate" measurement of depreciation were used so that the present
value of the right to a year's income were allocated to that year, the
longer the taxpayer held an asset, the greater the gain that he will
recognize. This is so because the taxpayer's basis in the later years of
use of a building is quite low compared to his basis in the earlier
years, and the value of those later years will increase substantially as
the present right to those later years approaches. Consequently, the
gain recognized in a sale after many years is far less likely to repre-
sent excessive depreciation than is a gain on a sale after a brief hold-
ing period. Accordingly, the additional depreciation that is subject
to recapture should be reduced by some percentage for each month
that the asset is held after a specified period of time. The percentage
of reduction and the period of holding could be determined by ex-
amining a number of examples where market conditions are held
constant and property is sold for the present value of the remaining
income stream. The effect of inflation on the real estate market has
been dramatic and gives special impetus for a revision or repeal of
section 1250.
The facts of building ownership cast even more doubt on the
wisdom of section 1250. The actual life of the shell of a building
typically is quite a bit longer than the useful life employed in depre-
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ciating it.'13 However, the internal portions of a building last for a
considerably shorter period, and the useful life that is employed
seeks to weigh the life of both the shell and the internal portion.
136
Furthermore, a longer useful life for the buildings would have little
effect on the proper amount of depreciation that is allowable. The
present value of the income from property more than 40 years after
its purchase, for example, would be so small as to justify disregard-
ing it. By way of illustration, the value of $1, discounted at a 12%
rate, 30 years in the future is a little more than 3¢; the value of a
dollar 40 years in the future is only 10; and a right to receive a dollar
50 years in the future is worth substantially less than 0.5¢. The
length of time employed as the useful life of a building is not likely
to distort depreciation to any significant extent.
Moreover, since the annual income from a building declines as
the building ages,' 37 the amount of the purchase price paid for the
anticipated income from the later years of a building's use will be
smaller than the amount paid for the earlier years, and the amount
attributable to the later years will be even further reduced if the pur-
chaser anticipated greater repair and maintenance costs in those later
years. 38 When this reduction of anticipated income is included in
the computation of the present value of the anticipated income for
years after some 30 or 40 years of use, it renders the current value of
those later years even more insignificant than indicated above. The
amount of purchase price for those later years can be disregarded as
de minimis.
There is even less justification for recapturing depreciation on
buildings than there is for recapturing depreciation of personalty.
The salvage value reduction provision of section 167(f) does not ap-
ply to the depreciation of buildings. The ADR election is not avail-
able for buildings placed into service after 1973.139 Consequently,
the only acceleration available for the depreciation of buildings is
through the method of depreciation employed. Under current law,
taxpayers can depreciate only new residential rental property at any
significantly accelerated rate. Unless Congress liberalizes the availa-
bility of acceleration, there is little reason to recapture any deprecia-
135. Taubman & Rasche, supra note 100, at 334, 337 n.12.
136. Id.
137. See text at note 114 supra.
138. It should be noted, however, that at least one study indicates that repair and mainte-
nance costs are not greater for older buildings. See Taubman & Rasche, supra note 100, at
336.
139. Rev. Proc. 77-3, 1977-1 C.B. 535.
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tion on buildings other than, perhaps, new residential rental
property. Even there, a substantial amount of acceleration is proper
because the greatest cost should be allocated to the early years of
rental use,' 40 and it is therefore doubtful whether any recapture is
justified, especially if the additional depreciation was previously sub-
jected to the minimum tax on tax preference items.
Before moving to the next topic, some consideration should be
given to whether, even assuming that the amount taxable as ordinary
income under the recapture rules is totally unrelated to whether the
taxpayer took an excessive amount of depreciation, the recapture
rules are nevertheless justifiable on other grounds. In other words,
even though the stated reason for adopting the recapture rules
proves to be fallacious, it is possible that there is a different and con-
vincing rationale for the ordinary income treatment imposed by sec-
tions 1245 and 1250. The principal alternative ground for justifying
recapture appears to be the contention that the recognition of a gain
should be characterized as ordinary income to the extent that the
gain is attributable to appreciation that occurs solely as a conse-
quence of the passage of time. In the instant context, this contention
would treat the appreciation in value of the future income stream of
a depreciable asset as either interest income or as sufficiently akin to
interest to warrant its being treated the same as interest for income
tax purposes. The proponents of this view would therefore allocate
the gain on the sale of a depreciable asset into two parts: the "inter-
est-type" appreciation that occurs because of the proximity of the
realization of the future income stream, and the gain or loss because
of external market conditions. For the reasons explained below, no
such allocation is justifiable. Before considering the merits of this
"interest-type" characterization, let us first examine Jones v. Commis-
sioner,'4' the principal judicial support for the allocation approach.
In Jones, the taxpayer had purchased a contingent remainder in-
terest in a trust. After the death of the life-income beneficiary, the
taxpayer's remainder vested, and his portion of the trust corpus be-
came distributable to him. If the taxpayer had continued to hold his
remainder interest and collected the trust corpus distribution, he
would have recognized ordinary income in an amount equal to the
difference between the corpus distributed to him and his basis in the
140. As previously noted, the anticipated income stream for the first one or two years of a
new building may be less than for later years because of the possibility of a higher vacancy
rate. See text following note 114 supra. If empirical data demonstrates that that is commonly
so, there is justification for recapturing depreciation for a new building that taxpayers hold
for only a short period of time (such as one year) before disposing of it.
141. 330 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1964).
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remainder interest. The reason that his gain would have been ordi-
nary income is that the distribution would not qualify as a "sale or
exchange" under section 1222. For the explicit purpose of avoiding
ordinary income treatment, the taxpayer sold his vested remainder
interest to a friend shortly before the trustee distributed the corpus.
The taxpayer then claimed that his gain on the sale was a long-term
capital gain.
In its first decision, 142 the Tax Court characterized the taxpayer's
gain as ordinary income under the anticipation of income doctrine.
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed. 143 However, the Third Cir-
cuit held that the discount that Jones received when he originally
purchased the remainder interest could be measured according to the
life expectancy of the life income beneficiary, and the gain that the
taxpayer recognized on the sale of the remainder interest was ordi-
nary income to the extent that it constituted a realization of that dis-
count income. The balance of the taxpayer's gain was a capital gain.
The Third Circuit remanded the case to the Tax Court to allocate the
taxpayer's receipts on the sale of the remainder interest between the
ordinary income component and the capital gain component.
On remand, the Tax Court noted that any appreciation in the
value of the taxpayer's remainder interest was not "interest," which
refers to an unqualified obligation to pay a definite sum for the use
of money, 14 but deemed itself bound by the Third Circuit's charac-
terization of part of the increase in value of the taxpayer's remainder
as interest income. Accordingly, it allocated 6% of Jones's purchase
price to income each year, compounded annually up to the date of
sale.
The Jones decision is an unfortunate promulgation of bad law to
mitigate the tax benefit that the taxpayer obtained by selling his re-
mainder interest and transmuting what would otherwise have been
ordinary income into capital gain. The Third Circuit apparently was
troubled by the fact that a sale made shortly prior to realization can
convert income that otherwise would be characterized as ordinary
into a capital gain. 145 The partial "cure" adopted by the Third Cir-
cuit is not supportable either by precedent or by tax policy.
The reasons for treating certain types of income as capital and
other types as ordinary are diverse and are beyond the scope of this
Article. It is worth noting, however, that a likely reason for treating
142. Donald B. Jones, 40 T.C. 249 (1963).
143. 330 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1964).
144. Donald J. Jones, MEMO T.C. (P-H) [ 66, 136.
145. See, e.g., Conrad N. Hilton, 13 T.C. 623 (1949).
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interest income as ordinary is that it is a current return on an "in-
vestment" (te., a loan of money) and is no different from any other
current return on an investment. In general, a capital gain applies
only to the proceeds derived from the termination of an investment
where the value of the investment has increased above the taxpayer's
cost. To the extent that the gain realized on a sale is attributable to
the recognition of current income that the taxpayer previously
earned but had not recognized because of his accounting method,
there may well be a case for characterizing the gain as ordinary. But,
that is not the case with the remainder interest in a trust, nor is it the
case with the gradual appreciation of the right to a future income
stream. Current income is an amount payable from a specific person
or persons to the taxpayer (such as is the case with the "interest"
element in an annuity). In the future income stream situation, there
is no person who owes income to the taxpayer. The value of the
taxpayer's asset increases because the income potential of the asset is
more valuable - the asset produces the same amount of income, but
the income has greater value to the owner of the property because of
its proximity. There is no obvious reason why the realization of the
appreciation in value of an asset should be characterized one way
when it arises steadily and predictably, but another way when it oc-
curs erratically and unpredictably. In either event, it is gain from the
appreciation in value of an asset rather than the recognition of cur-
rent income that had been deferred because of the taxpayer's ac-
counting method. The following example may be useful.
Suppose M, N, and 0 form a corporation to investigate whether
uranium is located on an area of land and to mine any uranium that
is discovered. One and one-half years later, the corporation discov-
ers uranium on its land. This discovery causes a substantial increase
in the value of the corporation's stock. The corporation will not be
able to mine the uranium for an additional year because of prepara-
tions that are necessary. Eight months after the discovery, M sells
his stock in the corporation at a gain. The value of A's stock rose
because:
(1) The time period for realizing income from the mine became
shorter while M held the stock, and thus the present value of the antici-
pated income from the mine rose (this increase took place both before
and after the discovery of the uranium, although the increase was more
speculative before the uranium was discovered);
(2) The corporation discovered that uranium was there to be mined.
It would hardly seem reasonable to divide A's gain into an ordinary
income and a capital gain component, and, contrary to the Jones
decision, no such division is made.
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VI. TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGETS
The principal thesis of this Article only incidentally touches on
the issue of the desirability of the Tax Expenditure Budget concept.
The concept is so important and of such scope that it warrants the
extensive treatment that it has received in the many works that have
already been written on that subject. Much more will be written on
this subject in the future, and I hope to participate in the continuing
debate. At a later date, I plan to write one or more articles discuss-
ing the propriety of the Budget, the uses to which it has been put,
and the inclusion of many of the items listed therein. Until that
time, a few comments may not be inappropriate.
It is desirable to reexamine the tax laws on a regular basis and to
determine what adjustments should be made in light of new tax poli-
cies. To the extent that the tax expenditure concept seeks to regular-
ize such reexaminations, it has a laudatory goal. But by designating
certain items as "expenditures," the Budgets crystallize the view that
those items are not proper measurements of income and deter fur-
ther inquiries into whether they do indeed conform with tax policies.
Part of the genius of the common law is that many judicial holdings
are justified by a purpose that wilts under scrutiny but nevertheless
prove to be good rules for entirely different reasons. Judges reach
results that typically are far better than the rationales they offer.
Concededly, the legislative process is quite different from the judicial
process. But a legislator's vote to adopt and retain a tax provision
may well rest on an intrinsic albeit unarticulated belief that the pro-
vision is appropriate for measuring taxable income. It is understand-
able that the committee reports would stress the benefits to a
deserving group rather than wrestle with technical income tax policy
concepts. The extent to which a legislator who voted for a medical
expense or theft deduction believed that he was providing relief to a
person in need and the extent to which he believed that such deduc-
tions were proper to measure the actual ability of such a victim to
bear a share of governmental costs is highly speculative. Such an
inquiry is also not very useful. What is useful is to determine
whether such items are proper measures of net income, regardless of
the reasons originally given for them.
If it were beyond question that the items included in the Budgets
are tax preferences, those objections might be too academic. But, in
my opinion, whether many of the items listed in the Budget are
properly classified as preferences or subsidies is open to serious ques-
tion. Our system should encourage exploration of serious issues.
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The inclusion of an item in the Budget tends to squelch such inquir-
ies.
In this regard, it is worth noting just a few of the items that have
been listed as tax expenditures. The surtax exemption for corpora-
tions previously provided by the corporate tax law was listed as a tax
expenditure. One might have regarded that exemption as simply a
part of the tax rate structure, but it was included in the Budget as an
expenditure because the amount of the exemption was so small in
comparison to corporate income that the exemption appears to have
been intended to serve as relief for small companies. The Revenue
Act of 1978 dispensed with the surtax exemption and instead
adopted a five-tier corporate tax rate under which the corporation's
first $100,000 of taxable income is taxed at rates lower than the maxi-
mum 46% rate. The Tax Expenditure Budgets have divided over
whether the lower corporate tax rates constitute a tax expenditure,
but Professors Surrey and McDaniel believe that the lower rates
should be so classified. 146 They rely, in part, on the fact that the
committee reports to the 1978 Act stressed the "small business"
thrust of the lower rates.1
47
The subjectivity of the determination of items to be included in
the Budget is troublesome. If there are statements in the legislative
history to the adoption of a tax provision that some of its proponents
urge its adoption in order to provide assistance to some group, then
that is taken as strong (or perhaps conclusive) evidence that the tax
provision is a subsidy.' 48 Legislative histories are not sufficiently re-
liable indicators of legislative purpose to justify using them for the
purpose of expenditure classification. If an item is a proper factor in
measuring net income, it should not become a tax preference merely
because some members of Congress either viewed it that way or de-
scribed it that way to make what they thought to be the strongest
political case for its adoption. Some members of Congress may well
be more concerned about the effect of proposed legislation on their
constituents than about the niceties of the proper measurement of
net income.
Some other questionable items that are included in the Budgets
are casualty loss deductions, medical expense and theft loss deduc-
tions, and the exclusion of an employer's contribution to an em-
ployee's medical insurance premiums or medical care expenses.
146. Surrey & McDaniel, supra note 8, at 225, 234-35.
147. Id. at 234-35.
148. Id. at 228, 234-35.
November 1979]
HeinOnline  -- 78 Mich. L. Rev. 55 1979-1980
Michigan Law Review
Until Congress repealed the percentage standard deduction, the
Budgets classified the excess of the percentage standard deduction
over the minimum standard deduction as an expenditure. Perhaps
the inclusion of such items was proper, but surely there are reason-
able justifications for those items that do not rest on tax subsidy no-
tions, and their inclusion in the Budgets is open to question.
In their excellent recent article, Professors Surrey and McDaniel
note that tax expenditure analysis does not point either to indexing
various transactions for inflation adjustments or to not doing so. 149
They maintain, however, that if Congress adopted indexing for mea-
suring the gain or loss on the sale of an asset and for purposes of
computing depreciation, it would be a tax expenditure unless Con-
gress also adopted indexing for all other types of transactions, such
as loans, which are affected by inflation.150 In other words,
nonindexing is the norm, so indexing only one or two items would be
a tax preference. But if Congress adopted indexing for measuring
gain or loss and for measuring depreciation, would that not make
indexing the norm, so that the failure to provide for indexing else-
where (such as loans) would be a tax preference or tax penalty (de-
pending upon whether the taxpayer is the lender or the borrower) in
those other areas? It is not clear how one determines which provi-
sion represents the norm and which represents the variance.
The Tax Expenditure concept is extremely important, and much
remains to be explored on that subject. The fact that an examination
of accelerated depreciation shows that it is not a tax preference dem-
onstrates the need for scrutinizing each item of a Tax Expenditure
Budget and not blindly accepting that it is a variance from the in-
come tax norms.
As a final note, I believe that the Tax Expenditure Budget pro-
motes a philosophy of taxation that, although unstated, is enjoying
increasingly widespread acceptance. When the income tax system
was first proposed, the opponents objected to the government's tak-
ing from its citizens the income that they had earned and which
therefore was assumed to belong to them. The Tax Expenditure
Budget turns that objection upside down by treating a taxpayer's
income virtually as government property, so that any portion of a
taxpayer's earnings that the government deigns to permit him to re-
tain is characterized as a "subsidy" to him. This, of course, over-
states the actual provisions of the Budget, but by using the term
149. Id. at 280-81.
150. Id.
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"Tax Expenditures," the subtle connotation of government's entitle-
ment to all income is planted. This connotation has been noted by
others, but it is vigorously disputed by Professors Surrey and Mc-
Daniel. l5'
The Tax Expenditure Budget purports to list government subsi-
dies that are made by failing to capture income that properly should
belong to the government rather than to the person who earned it.
This concept has spawned muckraking literature, antagonistic to the
current tax system, which has labeled our current system a "tax sub-
sidy for the rich" and an "upside-down welfare system."' 52 In my
view, there is a significant difference between taking income from A
and giving it to B (a subsidy for B) and leaving the income that A
earned with him (which does not appear to be a subsidy, however
unwise it might be as government policy). In addition to other (pre-
viously mentioned) failings, the Budget concept has contributed to
the erosion of the concept of private ownership of one's earnings. In
our complex society, some redistribution of wealth may be desirable
policy; but in planning a tax system, the presumption should favor
permitting a person to retain his earnings to the extent that it is feasi-
ble, and perhaps a healthy skepticism is appropriate for a concept
that suggests a contrary presumption. I do believe that tax provi-
sions should be reexamined from time to time and that the tax poli-
cies for retaining or altering them should be resolved,' 53 but the
quality of such a reexamination is more hindered than aided by la-
beling some provisions as expenditures and subsidies.
VII. CONCLUSION
The annual depreciation allowance for an asset should not rest
on the decline in value of the asset over that year. Rather, deprecia-
tion should reflect the amount the taxpayer expends for the use of
the asset during that year. An allocation of the actual cost is at least
a proper method of depreciation, and, in my view, is a more accu-
rate measurement of net income than straight line depreciation. Be-
cause accelerated depreciation is an accurate and appropriate
method of allocating cost, a number of current tax laws and prac-
151. Id. at 231-32.
152. See, e.g., S. STERN, THE RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER 5-8 (1973).
153. For an interesting proposal on how one might use the Tax Expenditure Budget for
this purpose, see McIntyre, supra note 25.
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tices, including the recapture of depreciation provisions and the Tax
Expenditure Budget items for depreciation, should be eliminated or
revised.
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